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INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers a critical examination of the genesis, content, 
and possible consequences of the voting rights decision in Shelby 
County v. Holder.1 This recent United States Supreme Court case, 
among the most provocative of the Roberts Court era, fits within a 
series of cases establishing a particularly radical judicial philosophy 
about democratic participation. Though the majority purports only to 
offer a technical and limited treatment of the Voting Rights Act’s 
administrative remedy, which targets certain states and jurisdictions in 
the country with a lengthy record of Fifteenth Amendment violations, 
the decision is one of several demonstrating the Court’s skepticism 
about federal safeguards for racial minorities’ role in political 
discourse. This skepticism is reflected most acutely in the Shelby 
County majority’s inattention to current evidence of racial 
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 1.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Without even identifying a standard of review, 
the Court dismissively brushes off arguments based on ‘data from the record,’ and declines to 
enter the ‘debat[e] [about] what [the] record shows.’ One would expect more from an opinion 
striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of civil-rights legislation.” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
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Assessing the constitutionality of a federal civil rights law, a 
certain Justice of the Supreme Court wrote about Black citizens, “by 
the aid of beneficent legislation, . . . there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and 
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws.”3 Echoes of this viewpoint 
rang rather loudly in oral argument for Shelby County when Justice 
Antonin Scalia attributed Congress’s nearly unanimous vote in 2006 
to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act to “a phenomenon that is called 
the perpetuation of racial entitlement,” adding rather sardonically, 
“it’s been written about.”4 
Justice Scalia was surely correct about one thing. The so-called 
phenomenon of racial entitlement has indeed been written about, and 
the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 are but one example.5 There, Justice 
Bradley invoked the phrase “special favorite of the laws” to admonish 
Congress that laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1875—designed to 
safeguard equal protection regardless of race—not only exceed 
Congress’s power but also impede the political progress of freedmen.6 
Bradley’s prediction was that Black citizens would fare quite fine in 
the former Confederate States, where slavery had been authorized by 
law and custom, even in the absence of protective federal legislation.7 
The subsequent experience of African Americans demonstrates 
the epic flaw of that ill-considered prediction. In the absence of 
sustained federal oversight, state-sponsored race discrimination in 
politics soon emerged. Despite the enactment of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, the systematic exclusion of non-Whites from 
politics—through state constitutions, statutes, intimidation, and 
violence—became the governing principle in these states for nearly 
one hundred years, until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965. Under the Act, the federal government had oversight over 
certain covered jurisdictions such that any changes these jurisdictions 
proposed related to voting had to be preapproved before they could 
 
 3.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). We employ the terms ‘Black’ and ‘African 
American’ interchangeably in this Article. 
 4.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96). 
 5.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (“When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the 
aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there 
must be some stage . . . when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special 
favorite of the laws . . . .”). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. (“There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition 
of slavery . . . ; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of their personal status 
as freemen because they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”). 
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go into effect, among other things.8 
Decades later, in 2006, and by an overwhelming margin, a 
Republican-controlled Congress voted to continue the work 
commenced in 1965 and extend the Act.9 The accompanying 
legislative report noted that the legacies and practices from this sad 
era of political exclusion had not yet been eradicated in these states.10 
Although registration and voting rates for non-White groups had 
improved in covered jurisdictions, patterns of racial prejudice and 
racially polarized voting, and the adoption of voter qualification laws 
remained more pronounced.11 Taken as whole, this record persuaded 
 
 8.  See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King, Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In light of the empirical record on racial disparities 
in covered jurisdictions available to the Shelby County Court, the language of “racial 
entitlement” is even more inapt than in the Civil Rights Cases. The racial entitlement arguments 
were articulated more than a century ago without the aid of either systematic data or the 
experience of the history of racial retrenchment in former slave-holding states. Both 
demonstrate today that arguments about racial entitlement for Blacks have proved to be 
fundamentally wrong, for it was the Court’s decision in 1883 that helped open the floodgates for 
widespread state-sponsored institutionalized voting discrimination, and not the intervention of 
Congress. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (“[N]o countenance of authority for the passage 
of the [Civil Rights Act] in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its passage being 
suggested, it must necessarily be declared void . . . .”). 
 9.  This Article will discuss three sections of the Voting Rights Act in particular—Sections 
2, 4, and 5. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (a permanent, nationwide provision) follows the 
traditional litigation-oriented remedy contained in other civil rights bills. Section 2 entitles a 
private citizen or the Department of Justice to seek a court-ordered remedy against a state or 
local jurisdiction that enacts a policy or practice whose purpose or effect denies or abridges the 
right to vote with respect to race. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013). The second, more 
controversial enforcement tool (the administrative remedy at issue in Shelby County) is Section 
5—also called the preclearance remedy. For designated areas (as defined by the targeting 
formula outlined in Section 4 of the Act), any proposed changes that relate to voting must be 
reviewed or “precleared” before they can go into effect. Id. § 1973c. The federal reviewing 
authority must find that the proposed change has neither the purpose nor the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote with respect to “race or color.” Id. § 1973c(a). The targeting 
formula that designates the states where Section 5 applies is outlined in Section 4. Id. § 1973b. 
States and jurisdictions in which less than half the eligible citizens were registered or 
participated in specified elections (initially, 1964) and that also applied certain qualification 
devices were included as “covered states.” See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 316–
20 (1966). See generally Kareem Crayton, Introduction to the Reports: Assessing Progress of the 
Voting Rights Act, 17 USC REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 65 (2008) (reviewing the evolution of the 
current provisions of the Voting Rights Act). 
 10.  See 152 CONG. REC. S8372–73 (daily ed. July 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(“Leading up to the final passage of the Voting Rights Act reauthorization, I provided the 
Senate with some of the extensive evidence received in the Judiciary Committee about the 
persistence of discriminatory practices in covered jurisdictions that supports reauthorization of 
this crucial provision.”). 
 11.  S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 11–12 (2006) (detailing evidence that demonstrates persistent 
discrimination in covered jurisdictions). 
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both Houses of Congress (by lopsided margins) that the risk was too 
great and the burden too high on non-White voters to end the special 
federal oversight of these states.12 
Only seven years later, in declaring parts of the Act 
unconstitutional, the Shelby County Court endorsed the view that 
race discrimination in covered jurisdictions is no longer a serious 
concern that merits special attention.13 But the evidence collected by 
Congress demonstrates a different position, that the problem remains 
a present danger that requires sustained federal vigilance.14 Whether 
race discrimination remains a present danger is at bottom a predictive 
judgment about society, which is precisely why the Justices should 
have relied upon the institution designed to make such an 
assessment.15 This Article is an effort to expound upon the record 
evidence that the Court seems to have disregarded. 
Part I of this Article examines the different substantive areas that 
undergird what we would define as the Roberts Court’s emerging 
philosophy on political participation. The Court’s record has been 
marked by a five-member majority that now drives these decisions. 
Part II provides a close analysis of the current social science evidence 
presented to the Court in Shelby County, in response to the Court’s 
query whether Section 4’s formula identifying covered jurisdictions 
was still relevant decades after the law was adopted. We show that the 
five members of the Roberts majority failed to account for the distinct 
political conditions present in these areas where preclearance applies 
compared to those where the remedial provision does not. Part III 
considers the various responsive steps that Congress might adopt in 
the wake of Shelby County; the motivation for each of these options 
rests upon how modestly one views the Court’s decision. We provide 
our own recommendation of and defense for what we see as the best 
 
 12.  The Act passed the House by a recorded vote of 390 to 33, 152 CONG. REC. H5207 
(daily ed. July 13, 2006), and passed the Senate without amendment by Yea-Nay vote of 98 to 0, 
152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006). 
 13.  Throughout this Article we use the phrases “covered jurisdictions” and “covered 
states” to refer to the subgroup of state and local governments that were designated for the 
special administrative review process outlined under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Although the status of these states has changed considerably in the wake of Shelby County, for 
simplicity and because it is unnecessary for the purposes of this Article, we do not distinguish 
between covered and formerly covered jurisdictions. 
 14.  See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 14–15 (2006). 
 15.  But see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (“Outside the strictures of 
the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and 
pursuing legislative objectives.”). 
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route, namely reinforcing Section 5.  
I. FIVE JUSTICES & SHELBY COUNTY 
Contrary to those who would characterize Shelby County as a 
modest statement about the scope of legislative authority, the case is 
part of a pattern of radical decisions penned by the Roberts majority.16 
In fact, we argue that the five members of the Roberts majority have 
left few doubts about the broad strokes of their viewpoint on the issue 
of democratic participation in general, and on the topic of minority 
voting rights in particular. Their decisions define a fairly clear agenda 
that does not offer especially happy news for advocates in the civil 
rights community. 
Although some had hoped that the Chief Justice would pursue a 
similarly conservative but pragmatic approach to these issues as his 
predecessor William Rehnquist, instead the Roberts majority has 
reopened debates previously considered long settled.17 Particularly in 
cases that implicate important issues of political participation, the 
Roberts majority has reached decisions and provided reasoning that 
reveal a certain coldness—even hostility—toward existing structures 
designed to assure open and equal involvement for historically 
marginalized groups in elections and governance.18 
A basic review of some of the Court’s most significant cases 
during the Roberts era highlights this point. Below, we compare the 
Roberts Court’s behavior with its predecessor (the Rehnquist Court) 
in three important areas of the law: (1) affirmative action, (2) 
campaign finance, and (3) voting rights. Using representative 
 
 16.  When we refer to the Roberts majority, we reference the emerging voting alliance that 
comprises the Chief Justice and Associate Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. These 
Justices have consistently formed the majority on the Court’s more controversial decisions 
implicating issues of democratic participation. See, e.g., id. at 2618; Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 
U.S. 1, 17, 25–26 (2009) (imposing a narrow interpretation of prima facie evidence of vote 
dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709 (2007). 
 17.  See discussion infra Parts I.A–I.C. 
 18.  See generally Shelby Cnty, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (holding Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act unconstitutional and effectively striking down the Section 5 preclearance provision); Nw. 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (holding that the 
Voting Rights Act permits all political subdivisions to seek bailout from the preclearance 
requirements of Section 5); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (finding 
constitutional a state law requiring voter identification before casting a ballot); League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (holding that a Texas district 
was drawn unconstitutionally but noting skepticism about the legitimacy of using race in the 
districting process). 
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decisions from each area of law, we demonstrate how Roberts has 
departed from the Rehnquist era doctrine in order to reopen 
previously settled matters in constitutional law.19 The new doctrinal 
terrain may prove perilous for non-White citizens, as they assume new 
burdens in light of the Court’s dismantling of existing structural 
protections. 
A. Affirmative Action 
The Chief Justice has rather consistently voted along with a 
majority to undo several policies related to affirmative action.20 
Whereas the Rehnquist era majority at times voiced unease with race-
conscious remedies,21 the Roberts majority has expressed very little 
hesitation when dismantling state-based programs that help offset 
disparate life chances for racial groups. Prior to Roberts’s 
confirmation, the Court followed Justice O’Connor’s suggested 
approach of weighing the particular facts and circumstances, and 
assessing the institutional justification behind a given affirmative 
action policy.22 For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger,23 the Court upheld 
the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action plan on 
the ground that maintaining a diverse law school class promoted a 
key social good.24 Though race-conscious remedies were disfavored 
even then, a state was able to adopt policies to assure that fellow 
 
 19.  Although Ricci v. DeStefano, discussed below, is explicitly a case involving Title VII, 
the decision relies on the Court’s understanding of the defendant city’s obligations to prevent 
racial discrimination in its employment qualification exams, which in turn implicates the 
Fourteenth Amendment color-blindness norms that form the basis of the plaintiff class in this 
case. 
 20.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 705 (striking down voluntary 
school desegregation and integration efforts as not sufficiently “narrowly tailored”). 
 21.  See generally Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495 (2000); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
(1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 22.  See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 288–90 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“The imposition of a requirement that public employers make findings that they 
have engaged in illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action programs would 
severely undermine public employers’ incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights 
obligations.”); id. at 292 (“[I]n order to provide some measure of protection to the interests of 
its nonminority employees and the employer itself in the event that its affirmative action plan is 
challenged, the public employer must have a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is 
warranted.”). 
 23.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 24.  Id. at 308. But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273–75 (2003) (holding that the 
affirmative action program for the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions was 
unconstitutional because the University automatically awarded points necessary for admission 
to minority applicants).  
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students and the broader public enjoyed the benefits of a community 
of legal professionals who represented and were familiar with all 
segments of society.25 Using the Michigan model, schools could pursue 
the goal of maintaining a critical mass of non-White students in order 
to achieve a diverse and successful intellectual community.26 
The Roberts Court thus far has shown far less deference to state 
actors who decide to pursue such concerns.27 In place of the Rehnquist 
era deference to educational institutions that choose to pursue 
affirmative action programs, the Roberts Court has erected a 
generally unforgiving prohibition on race-conscious decision-making 
such that few if any such programs will survive scrutiny—even where 
the stated goal is diversity. 
The Roberts majority’s approach was presented most clearly in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1,28 where a local school district sought to maintain student 
populations that were balanced based on race and other factors 
through a race-conscious student assignment plan.29 Although the 
school’s assignment plan was to be entirely voluntary, the Court 
voided this approach because of its attention to a classification that it 
viewed as arbitrary.30 Harkening back to the traditional discrimination 
cases that invoked strict scrutiny for all such classifications—
pernicious or benign—the Court articulated its guiding principle: 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”31 The school district’s concerns 
about diversity were not sufficient to create a meaningful exception to 
this seemingly bright line rule. The Court held that absent a pattern of 
racial exclusion, the local government could not justify implementing 
programs to enhance diversity in public schools.32 In so finding, the 
Court effectively eviscerated a program with a structure and goal that 
 
 25.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29 (“The Law School's educational judgment that such 
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
 26.  Id. at 329–30 (“As part of its goal of ‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally 
academically qualified and broadly diverse,’ the Law School seeks to ‘enroll a “critical mass” of 
minority students.’” (citation omitted)).  
 27.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013) (suggesting 
that under strict scrutiny review, universities are entitled to some but not total deference with 
respect to their decision to employ affirmative action programs, and no deference with respect 
to the question of narrow tailoring). 
 28.  551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 29.  Id. at 711–12. 
 30.  Id. at 703–04. 
 31.  Id. at 747–48. 
 32.  Id. at 702–03. 
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mirrored the approach to affirmative action that had been embraced 
during the Rehnquist era.  
The Roberts majority has applied its new approach beyond the 
educational sphere. In Ricci v. DeStefano,33 the Court roundly 
criticized an employment-related affirmative action plan because the 
plan interfered with what the Court viewed as the normal course of 
local governance.34 There, a city government vacated the results of an 
employment-qualifying exam for firefighters, in part due to concern 
that the city might be subject to a discrimination lawsuit.35 Although 
the employer took subsequent preventative action to ensure that its 
exam was free from racially disparate effects, the Court ordered the 
original exam results reinstated, effectively voiding the impact of the 
city’s race-conscious reforms.36 
One operative feature of the Ricci decision was the assessment of 
the process that gave rise to the city’s preemptive action. The holding 
seemingly rests on the assumption that the normal order of public 
governance would never have mandated the invalidation of an exam 
that had already been administered.37 This analysis leaves out any 
valid consideration of the exam’s ability to measure qualifications 
accurately or to prevent unlawful racially disparate effects.38 In 
addition, some of the Justices took note of the involvement of special 
interest groups, including a local minister who called public attention 
to the racial impact of the exam.39 In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Alito expounded on his unease with the close relationship between 
 
 33.  557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 34.  Id. at 562–63. 
 35.  Id. at 562. 
 36.  Id. at 593 (“[T]he City was required to make a difficult inquiry [regarding the prospect 
of disparate-impact liability]. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate-
impact violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely on the racial 
disparity in the results.”). 
 37.  See id. at 585 (noting that employers are entitled to employ “affirmative efforts to 
ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the 
process by which promotions will be made,” but that once established, employers “may not then 
invalidate the test results”). 
 38.  See id. at 587, 592 (finding it sufficient that “the examinations were job related and 
consistent with business necessity,” and refuting the argument that the examination may have 
produced discriminatory results); Cheryl Harris & Kimberley West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: 
Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 83 (2010). 
 39.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 600–01 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Civil Service Board [or CSB] . . 
. convened its first public meeting. Almost immediately, Rev. Kimber began to exert political 
pressure on the CSB. . . . Reverend Kimber protested the public meeting, arguing that he and 
the other fire commissioners should first be allowed to meet with the CSB in private.” (citations 
omitted)).  
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New Haven’s mayor and an African American minister, Reverend 
Kimber, who was a “self-professed kingmaker.”40 The city’s 
acquiescence to the minister’s pressure to eliminate the exam 
apparently indicated a kind of dysfunction of the political process, 
because the outcome was likely affected by some external (and 
undue) leverage. 
The holding suggests that, from the viewpoint of the Roberts 
majority, the (presumably unfounded) threat of a discrimination 
lawsuit led the city to acquiesce41—which represented an abdication 
of the city’s duty to respond to the broader public. Put differently, the 
Court suspected that the political decision to suspend the exams was 
flawed because an entrenched minority demanded the adoption of a 
policy that ran counter to the interests of a majority of citizens. 
However, this rent-seeking outcome commonly occurs in politics 
when a small group with especially high stakes in a policy 
concentrates its effort on lobbying government for policy 
concessions—including ones that do not align with majority 
preferences. The reasoning of the case suggests that minority groups 
could not have obtained a policy to benefit non-Whites without undue 
influence.42 The effectiveness of minority groups was presumed not 
the result of traditional democratic bargaining but of unfair 
leveraging that harmed at least the plaintiff class in Ricci and perhaps 
the larger community.  
B. Campaign Finance 
The second area of constitutional doctrine that is now in play 
under the Roberts Court is campaign finance. Few people would 
characterize earlier eras of the Court as rampant with decisions 
encouraging robust federal regulation. It has long been established, 
however, that there is a clear legal distinction between enforcing 
limits on campaign spending (which remained relatively unregulated) 
and limits on fundraising (which, based upon concerns about 
 
 40.  Id. at 598 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 41.  See id. at 592 (majority opinion) (“[T]here is no genuine dispute that the City lacked a 
strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the 
examination results.”). 
 42.  See id. at 598–99 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he District Court admitted that ‘a jury 
could rationally infer that city officials worked behind the scenes to sabotage the promotional 
examinations because they knew that, were the exams certified, the Mayor would incur the 
wrath of [Rev. Boise] Kimber and other influential leaders of New Haven's African-American 
community.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
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transparency and corruption, were subject to strict constraints).43 Not 
only has the Roberts majority effectively eviscerated these 
distinctions,44 it has now introduced the wildcard of corporate 
personhood into the conversation.45 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,46 the Roberts 
majority voided key provisions of the McCain-Feingold Act,47 at least 
one of which had been upheld during the Rehnquist era in McConnell 
v. Federal Election Commission.48 The decision in Citizens United 
stands for the proposition that corporations and unions exercise 
speech rights comparable to those of a natural person under the First 
Amendment.49 Accordingly, the government may not limit the 
expenditure of union or corporate general funds when they are used 
to support independent election-related activity like campaign 
commercials.50 
Unlike the direct support of a campaign or candidate, the Court 
reasoned, independent expenditures do not create the same risks of 
political corruption that justify regulation.51 So long as the group in 
question does not coordinate directly with a candidate’s campaign, its 
 
 43.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (upholding the Federal Election 
Campaign Act’s individual contribution limits, but invalidating the Act’s limitations on 
campaign expenditures). See generally Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1469 (2001) (questioning whether campaign finance reform can be inclusive of multi-racial 
interests). 
 44.  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010) (“The Government may 
regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may 
not suppress that speech altogether.”). 
 45.  See id. at 343 (“[P]olitical speech of corporations or other associations should [not] be 
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural 
persons.’”). 
 46.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 47.  Id. at 365 (“[O]verruling Austin ‘effectively invalidate[s] not only [the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act] Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition on the use of corporate 
treasury funds for express advocacy.’ Section 441b's restrictions on corporate independent 
expenditures are therefore invalid . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 48.  See 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, relating to soft-money contributions and certain electioneering communications).  
 49.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 313 (“Bellotti reaffirmed the First Amendment principle 
that the Government lacks the power to restrict political speech based on the speaker's 
corporate identity.” (citing First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978))). 
 50.  Id. at 353 (holding that “[t]here is simply no support for the view that the First 
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political speech by 
media corporations”). 
 51.  Id. at 314 (“[T]his Court now concludes that independent expenditures, including 
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. 
That speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those 
officials are corrupt.”). 
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financial backing of an independent viewpoint in the political 
discourse must not be limited.52 Indeed, the Court even appeared to 
endorse the suggestion that more speech of this kind actually 
improved, not distorted, the public’s deliberative process—providing 
further support for its surprising and sweeping decision.53 
The holding in Citizens United is closely tied to a view the Roberts 
majority has about the proper functioning of the democratic process. 
The Roberts majority embraces the Rehnquist era notion that money 
is a form of protected political speech. However, Roberts goes much 
further in advancing the proposition that corporate speech is 
equivalent in value and impact to individual speech.54 Thus, the 
Roberts majority appears less concerned with the dangers of 
unbridled spending on political messaging and voters’ ability to 
discern how their preferences align with the groups behind the 
messages. 
The point is not just one of abstract curiosity. It also carries major 
consequences for political outcomes. Principally, the decision led to 
the proliferation of Super PACs.55 The Super PAC often serves as a 
shell for corporations and political parties, permitting these groups to 
funnel unregulated money from anonymous donors in amounts that 
go as deep as personal bank accounts will permit.56 So long as Super 
PACs can justify their classification as “social welfare groups,” there is 
 
 52.  See id. at 360 (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the 
electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political 
speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.” (citing Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976))). 
 53.  See id. at 312 (“The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law 
it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in the political 
speech context, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”). 
 54.  See id. at 365 (“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. 
No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-
profit corporations.”); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited, THE NEW YORKER (May 21, 
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/05/21/120521fa_fact_toobin?currentPage=all 
(emphasizing that the Court could have decided the case on much narrower grounds, and that 
the broad holding ultimately reached “reflects the aggressive conservative judicial activism of 
the Roberts Court”).  
 55.  Richard L. Hasen, Super-Soft Money: How Justice Kennedy Paved the Way for 
‘SuperPACS’ and the Return of Soft Money, SLATE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/10/citizens_united_how_justice_kennedy_has_pav
ed_the_way_for_the_re.html. 
 56.  See Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644–45 (2012) (“Super 
PACs spent an estimated $65 million on independent expenditures in 2010 . . . . By early 2012, 
Super PACs were already major participants in the 2011-2012 election cycle, significantly 
outspending the candidates in the early Republican presidential nominating contests.”). 
CRAYTON AND JUNN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014 1:19 PM 
124 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9 
no requirement to report funding sources or membership, obscuring 
the sponsors of attack ads.57 The effect on the political process is a 
deluge of heavily funded messages unattributed to groups or to 
specific individuals. This information distortion often prevents 
individuals from understanding how major political interests align on 
a given issue.58 
The stakes are likely more pronounced when one takes account of 
race, because the issues of who gives and how much tend to be driven 
to a significant degree by one’s racial background. As Professor Terry 
Smith has persuasively noted, political communities with heavy 
concentrations of racial minorities tend to feature low levels of 
individual political giving.59 Where this is true, candidates and 
campaigns are often more dependent on corporate infusions of cash 
or, alternatively, more vulnerable to a well-funded challenger. 
To the extent that Citizens United permits more funding of 
unattributed political messages, in these communities candidates are 
more likely to be swayed by external, concentrated interests that may 
undermine the interests of their constituencies. As Black candidates 
are rarely self-funders,60 their need to pursue non-coordinated Super 
PAC dollars adds more pressure on voters in these areas to ensure 
that their collective policy interests retain priority over (now 
anonymous) corporate concerns.  
C. Voting Rights 
Finally, the area with the most direct linkage to the issue at hand is 
voting rights. Here as well, the Roberts majority has sharply departed 
from the Rehnquist era cases that addressed the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act—especially with respect to the now-inert preclearance provision. 
 
 57.  Kathy Kiely & Jacob Fenton, Outside Political Spending Crosses $1 Billion Mark, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2012, 7:09 AM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/ 
2012/outside-political-spending-crosses-1-billion-mark/ (“Outside groups' $1 billion has funded 
an overwhelmingly negative shadow campaign: More than 80 percent of the spending has gone 
to oppose, rather than support, candidates. And it includes $219 million in dark money—
donations from nonprofit organizations which, because of their tax-exempt status, will never 
have to disclose their donors.”); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-(1) (2013). 
 58.  BLAIR BOWIE & ADAM LIOZ, DEMOS & U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, MILLION-
DOLLAR MEGAPHONES: SUPER PACS AND UNLIMITED OUTSIDE SPENDING IN THE 2012 
ELECTIONS 6 (2012), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
MegaphonesMillionaires-DemosUSPIRG.pdf; see also Brian Montopoli, Colbert Super PAC Ad 
Promises “Orgy of Pure Distortion”, CBS NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
8301-503544_162-57361118-503544/colbert-super-pac-ad-promises-orgy-of-pure-distortion/.  
 59.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 43, at 1499–1500, 1512–15. 
 60.  Id. 
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The Roberts majority has reopened questions thought long settled 
about the legitimacy of the Act and introduced novel questions that 
leave observers mystified about how far the current Court intends to 
move the doctrine. 
To be sure, there were some reasons for concern about the vitality 
of the preclearance regime even during the Rehnquist era. Starting 
with City of Boerne v. Flores,61 the Court indicated its desire to more 
carefully review federal anti-discrimination laws to assure that they 
were within the scope of legislative enforcement authority.62 In City of 
Boerne, the Court devised a test that turned on evidence of 
congruence and proportionality between observed constitutional 
injuries and the remedy contemplated in the statutory scheme.63 
Though several enactments were voided for lack of constitutional 
fit during the Rehnquist era,64 advocates retained guarded optimism 
about the constitutionality of Section 5, the administrative remedy in 
the Voting Rights Act, for two reasons.65 First, the Court had 
repeatedly cited Section 5 as a model of a federal law whose limits 
and evidentiary foundation complied with the rubric set forth in City 
of Boerne.66 Although several commentators have opined that these 
citations only referred to the original 1965 enactment (and not the 
later extensions),67 there was at least some foundation for the belief 
 
 61.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 62.  Id. at 518 (“It is also true, however, that ‘[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement 
power is, it is not unlimited.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 
128 (1970))). 
 63.  Id. at 530 (“While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, 
there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved.”). 
 64.  See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (striking down 
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91–92 (2000) (striking down the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
as applied to the states). 
 65.  Section 5, the administrative remedy in the Voting Rights Act, directs jurisdictions 
specified by Section 4 to preclear “any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2013). A 
jurisdiction can seek review by the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment by the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. In either case, the jurisdiction needs to 
show that the change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." Id. 
 66.  See, e.g., Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (“Here, as in Katzenbach . . . 
Congress again confronted a difficult and intractable proble[m] . . . where previous legislative 
attempts had failed.” (citations omitted)). 
 67.  See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights 
Act: How Much Discrimination can the Constitution Tolerate, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 
387 (2008); Richard Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 196 (2005). 
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that a challenge to Section 5 would not succeed.68 
A second reason for a patina of hope was rooted in the Court’s 
reasoning as it worked through the doctrinal line of cases following 
City of Boerne. In approving federal legislation in various cases, the 
Court developed an analytical framework that seemed to offer a 
favorable view of Section 5.69 For example, in Tennessee v. Lane,70 the 
Court noted that Section 5 was a valid congressional enactment 
insofar as it responded to a clear pattern of state discrimination in a 
congruent and proportional way.71 Even in dissent, Justice Scalia 
synthesized the earlier cases in a way that established a kind of 
“sliding scale” approach to scrutiny depending on the type of 
legislation under review.72 For laws addressing fundamental rights (as 
in Lane) or suspect classifications (as in Nevada v. Hibbs73), the Court 
has been disposed to apply a more forgiving analysis with respect to 
constitutional “fit” that does not as easily overturn a remedial 
enactment.74 Insofar as Section 5 implicated the intersection of these 
two factors—protecting the right to vote for racial minorities—any 
subsequent challenge under this recitation of the City of Boerne 





 68.  This is principally because the Court had upheld the Act against several past 
challenges. See, for example, City of Rome v. United States, where the Court approved a 1982 
congressional extension of Section 5 against an attack by Georgia officials, who suggested that 
federal oversight was no longer necessary. 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980). 
 69.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (noting that congressional power 
is heightened when Congress enacts remedial legislation that addresses problems at the 
convergence of race and fundamental rights); see also Hasen, supra note 67, at 181–82 
(discussing decisions by the Court to uphold federal legislation). 
 70.  541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 71.  Id. at 532–33.  
 72.  See id. at 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying the “permissive McCulloch standard to 
congressional measures designed to remedy racial discrimination by the States,” and noting that 
“Congress may impose prophylactic § 5 legislation only upon those particular States in which 
there has been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations,” and that the 
prophylactic remedy “must be directed against the States or state actors rather than the public 
at large”). 
 73.  538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 74.  See id. at 539 (discussing how the City of Boerne analysis applies to remedies for state 
violations of fundamental rights like due process); see also Pamela Karlan, Section 5 Squared: 
Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007) 
(observing that when “Congress acts to protect a fundamental right or when it acts to protect a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class, its powers are generally broader than when it acts to promote 
equality more generally”). 
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In the Roberts Court’s first major Section 5 case, Northwest Austin 
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (NAMUNDO),75 the 
complaining jurisdiction argued that its inability to bail out of the 
preclearance process was a fatal constitutional flaw in the provision.76 
Taking the Rehnquist era doctrine on its face, the local jurisdiction 
could not have independently exited the preclearance system because 
it was situated within a wholly covered state.77 In an earlier case, City 
of Rome v. United States,78 the Court made this point clear based on a 
straightforward application of interpretive principles.79 The statutory 
text simply did not lend itself to such a reading, and the legislative 
record included analogous situations that Congress clearly intended 
to prohibit when it designed the law’s administrative remedy.80 
Yet, NAMUNDO departs from this view notwithstanding 
expressed concerns in City of Rome and related voting rights cases 
that manipulation of state election administration power vis-à-vis 
local authorities would go undetected,81 along with historical 
experience that suggested the same.82 The NAMUDNO Court noted 
that the ruling served the interests of local policymaking bodies that 
needed to perform basic functions without the overwhelming burdens 
of federal oversight.83 Indeed, though Roberts declined to address the 
constitutional question about Section 5, he noted that the issue raised 
 
 75.  557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 76.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief at 12, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (No. 08-32) (“The district 
court’s interpretation makes bailout a virtual nullity in all but a very few covered jurisdictions, 
apparently all in Virginia. Moreover, that interpretation reorders state government by putting 
counties in control of entities not subject to their authority under state law.”). 
 77.  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 209.  
 78.  446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
 79.  Id. at 173 (“[A]ppellants urge that . . . § 5, to the extent that it prohibits voting changes 
that have only a discriminatory effect, is unconstitutional. Because the statutory meaning and 
congressional intent are plain, however, we . . . reject the appellants' suggestion that we engage 
in a saving construction and avoid the constitutional issues they raise.”). 
 80.  Id. at 178–80. 
 81.  Compare NAMUNDO, 446 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“More than 40 years after its enactment, this intrusion has become increasingly difficult 
to justify.”), with United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 111 (1978) 
(“[Excluding localities from preclearance obligations] permits precisely the kind of 
circumvention of congressional policy that § 5 was designed to prevent.”). 
 82.  Indeed, the tactic of devolving authority from the state level to the local level to evade 
federal constitutional demands was one of the very experiences that Congress addressed in 
devising the Voting Rights Act in 1965. See Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D. 
Ala. 1965). 
 83.  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202 (“At the same time, § 5, which authorizes federal 
intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial federalism 
costs.” (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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concerns that the Court would likely consider at some point in the 
near future.84 From Roberts’s perspective, the remedial provision did 
not make clear why some of the covered jurisdictions continued to 
merit special treatment and others did not.85 Once the issue was 
squarely presented, the Court was likely to demand clear justification 
for the disparate treatment, especially due to the severe interference 
with the “sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.”86 
The underlying message about democratic participation had all 
the subtlety of a crashing cymbal: Local governments could properly 
handle the business of the people without an artificial process 
centered on racial considerations. And given that the available record 
evidence left the Roberts majority unpersuaded about whether 
covered states were distinct from non-covered states, there is little 
wonder that the concerns animating City of Rome carried little 
weight.87 For the Roberts majority, the racial fairness agenda has 
resolutely and completely lost its priority in favor of local political 
governance concerns. 
II. WHAT THE COURT IN REVIEWING SECTION 4 REFUSED TO 
ACKNOWLEDGE ABOUT CONTINUING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
This Part turns to the decision and reasoning in Shelby County 
itself, focusing on the material presented to the Court. Specifically, 
this Part reviews the abundant social science data showing the current 
distinctions in covered jurisdictions that helped to animate Congress’s 
action to renew the statutory remedy in 2006. In light of the readily 
available record evidence that shows empirically verifiable 
differences between covered states and the rest of the country, the 
Court’s claim that it found no rational connection between current 





 84.  Id. at 211 (noting that “[i]n part due to the success of [the Voting Rights Act], we are 
now a very different Nation,” but that “[w]hether conditions continue to justify such legislation 
is a difficult constitutional question we do not answer today”). 
 85.  Id. at 203–04.  
 86.  Id. at 202 (noting that members of the Court have previously expressed misgivings 
about the constitutionality of Section 5 due to the provision’s “federalism costs”). 
 87.  See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 167 (1980) (noting that “the coverage 
formula of § 4(b) has never been applied” to the defendant city, but that the city nonetheless 
“comes within the Act because it is part of a covered State”). 
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The pernicious history that gave rise to Congress’s initial 
enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 was deep and prolonged 
enough to merit a long-term federal response. Further, the 
contemporary record presented to the Court demonstrates that this 
legacy is not very easily forgotten. The most recalcitrant states 
identified in 1965 remain works in progress. 
A. The Voting Rights Act Did Not Respond to a Short-Term Problem 
No party in Shelby County disputed the fact that Congress’s 
intervention in 1965 to rid the country of race discrimination in the 
political arena was warranted. Though Shelby County asserted that 
the time had arrived for this project to end, the basis on which it 
framed the argument was both incomplete and contrary to 
contemporary empirical evidence documenting the persistence of 
racial disparity in covered jurisdictions.88 
The Shelby County Court mistook the goal of removing the legal 
barriers to non-White citizens registering to vote as a limited and 
short-term effort.89 This perspective ignored the fact that preventing 
minority citizens from being excluded from voting in covered 
jurisdictions was but one aspect of Congress’s broader effort to end 
institutionalized political exclusion based on race. The racially 
discriminatory practices embedded in institutions, political culture, 
and popular attitudes that necessitated the Voting Rights Act were 
nourished by the institution of slavery and have deep roots dating 
back centuries. Thus, ensuring that minority citizens could get to the 
ballot box was a necessary but not at all sufficient step to address the 
problem. 
We argue that institutionalized race discrimination was in fact the 
evil that the statute addresses, which is a long-term project. 
Institutionalized race discrimination was the effective political norm 
in the South for nearly a century after the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Under the system of Jim Crow, state government 
institutions prevented non-Whites from exercising their 
constitutionally protected rights, which included, inter alia, casting 
ballots, engaging in political activities like campaigning, and enjoying 
responsive government representation. 
 
 88.  See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 28, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 
12-96) (stating that “[n]othing in the record suggests that covered jurisdictions remain engaged 
in the pervasive voting discrimination and electoral gamesmanship”). 
 89.  Id. at 29. 
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1. Institutionalized Discrimination in the South pre-1965 
Congress has recognized on multiple occasions that dismantling 
deeply entrenched racial discrimination in the political system 
demands sustained vigilance. Otherwise, there could be no assurance 
that states would not reverse course on the hard won protections that 
took decades to establish.90 In this regard, it is worth highlighting the 
obvious: This concern with the risk of state retrenchment is not just 
one of abstract logic but of historical experience. The imperative of 
protecting the equal right to vote regardless of race has only been 
systematically enforced since the 1965 Act and South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach,91 a mere half-century ago, compared with the practice of 
explicit racial discrimination that occurred during the century prior. 
Put differently, the current era is a fraction of the length of time that 
the period of institutionalized political exclusion was the order of the 
day in the American South. 
We refer to institutionalized political exclusion as a system, 
represented in the structures, practices, and norms of government 
institutions, designed to deny or limit the political effectiveness of a 
specific class of citizens. The concept reflects a fundamental 
organization of private and public power to deny a targeted group an 
equal share of the inputs and outputs of government. This political 
model reflects a jointly held agreement by the larger electorate to 
reject the excluded group’s status as equal citizens, which is a 
principle born of personal or group animus. The realm of politics 
therefore is set aside for the involvement and enjoyment of several 
interests—but not those of the excluded group. The point of 
describing the model as institutionalized is that this system is both 
self-reinforcing (meaning that it is perpetual) and that it is resistant to 
contrary external pressures. 
In the post-Reconstruction American South, the exclusion of 
Black voters illustrates this model quite well. Even though the 
 
 90.  See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5143 (2006) (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner) (“In fact, the extensive record of continued abuse compiled by the committee 
over the last year, which I have put on the table here today, echoes that which preceded 
congressional reauthorization of the [Voting Rights Act] in 1982.”). See also CHARLES S. 
BULLOCK III & RONALD KEITH GADDIE, THE TRIUMPH OF VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH 8–
20 (2009) (describing the motivation and timing of congressional enactments aimed at providing 
access to the ballot, beginning in 1957 with the Civil Rights Act—in addition to subsequent 
versions of the Act passed in 1960 and 1964—and the 1965 Voting Rights Act and subsequent 
reauthorizations in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006).  
 91.  383 U.S. 301 (1966).  
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Constitution had been amended to establish and safeguard the equal 
status of freedmen, the politics of the former Confederate States did 
not long embrace this principle in practice. Indeed, these states soon 
returned to their prior practice of marginalizing and subjugating 
Blacks in both law and practice. Through both public and private 
efforts, the noteworthy but brief period of Black political 
participation, officeholding, and policymaking ended with a 
multifaceted campaign to re-establish the norm that reduced Blacks 
in these states to second-class citizenship. We expound below on the 
components of institutionalized exclusion as they were manifested in 
the post-Reconstruction South. 
2. The Ideology of Racial Animus 
At the core of the strategy for retrenchment was the ideology of 
racism itself—the popular denial among Whites of the political and 
even natural equality of Black persons. Linked to the bare racial 
animus on which slavery itself was founded, the expressions of the 
inherent inferiority of Blacks were framed as arguments that Blacks 
were less educated, inclined toward corruption, and genetically 
attuned toward savagery.92 This ideological frame was promulgated by 
several political figures and animated campaigns throughout the 
twentieth century.93 Aside from the personal benefit to the individual 
politician, the argument called for political and social systems to 
assure that the less civilized class of persons remained distanced from 
the reins of government power. Accordingly, state legislatures 
developed criminal laws intended to target Black citizens, adopted 
qualification devices that privileged Whites, and condoned private 
acts of violence that sought to enforce a norm of inferiority through 
terror.94 
The ideology also focused on curtailing political activities that are 
key precursors to political participation, such as the ability of citizens 
to organize and to associate. Social science recognizes that one’s 
 
      92.    See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND 
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978) (cataloging the foundations 
of racial ideologies in the early colonial period).  
      93.    See V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS: IN STATE AND NATION 142–45, 241–46 (1949) 
(recounting the racial campaigns employed by figures including Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman of 
South Carolina and Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi).  
     94.   See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the 
Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27, 31–37 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (reviewing 
examples of efforts to limit political freedoms using qualification devices and criminal 
provisions). 
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likelihood to register and vote partly depends upon one’s level of 
involvement in civic life,95 including traditional political activities such 
as attending rallies, signing petitions, and seeking redress of 
grievances.96 The Supreme Court has recognized these core activities 
as protected under the First Amendment.97 
In maintaining institutionalized political exclusion, preclearance 
states were responsible for some of the most egregious restrictions on 
these rights. The State of Alabama is a rather notorious example—it 
adopted laws that required the publication of membership lists from 
civil rights organizations.98 In addition, Alabama, among other states, 
implicitly sanctioned violent criminal activity against certain 
Americans exercising their rights of association by under-enforcing 
the law in the face of blatantly discriminatory and unlawful behavior.99 
Not until decades after citizens were killed for engaging in activities 
like registering voters did the government attempt to correct flawed 
state court trials that previously failed to convict wrongdoers.100 
3. Vote Denial 
To be sure, the most obvious feature of institutionalized racial 
exclusion is denying minority citizens the opportunity to register and 
vote. The ability to exercise the franchise itself represents an 
important marker of equal status as citizens, and the long-time denial 
of this right in certain states was a critical element of the asserted 
theory of second-class citizenship. Put differently, disenfranchisement 
 
 95.  See William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic 
Education, 4 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 217, 224 (2001); James B. Hyman & Peter Levine, Civic 
Engagement and the Disadvantaged: Challenges, Opportunities and Recommendations 1–7 (The 
Ctr. for Info. & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, Working Paper No. 63, Dec. 2008), 
available at http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/WorkingPapers/WP63_Hyman_Levine.pdf.  
 96.  Sidney Verba et al., Race Ethnicity and Political Participation, in CLASSIFYING BY 
RACE 354, 355 (Paul Peterson ed., 1995).  
 97.  See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 230–33, 238 (1963) (finding that 
convictions of protesters at the state capitol violated the freedom to petition for redress of 
grievances); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 518 (1939) (reaffirming the 
freedom to assemble peaceably); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937) (“The holding of 
meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (holding that the right of peaceable assembly is an attribute of national 
citizenship and is guaranteed by the United States). 
 98.  See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958) (discussing the State of Alabama’s 
requirement that the NAACP produce membership lists). 
 99.  See STEVEN A. LIGHT, THE LAW IS GOOD: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 
REDISTRICTING, AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS 42–43 (2010). 
 100.  Dan Barry et al., When Cold Cases Stay Cold, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/us/souths-cold-cases-reopened-but-still-unresolved.html?pa 
gewanted=all&_r=0. 
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was the linchpin in the plan to maintain an unconstitutional scheme of 
discrimination in all facets of public and private life. From the end of 
the Reconstruction era, the effort to undo the guarantees of the 
Reconstruction Amendments targeted the franchise as a primary 
means to control the political and social advancement of Blacks.101 
Curtailing the exercise of the franchise also reversed another clear 
metric of progress—the election of Black political candidates for state 
and federal offices. 
Common efforts during the post-Reconstruction era included the 
adoption of devices like the grandfather clause, poll taxes, and literacy 
tests. In the long term, states attempted to cement these changes with 
the ratification of new constitutions to prevent the realization of 
political power among those previously excluded from voting on the 
basis of race.102 And, as Morgan Kousser has amply demonstrated, the 
use of private violence was a factor that worked in concert with the 
more formalized practices of maintaining a stranglehold on the 
exercise of Black political power.103 
Due to systematic disenfranchisement on the basis of race, the 
most recalcitrant of segregationist politicians were able to represent 
some of the largest concentrations of African Americans in the 
South.104 These politicians had no reason to address or even 
acknowledge the issues most relevant to non-Whites. Indeed, many of 
the early efforts by Congress to pass civil rights legislation (including 
voting rights bills) were thwarted by segregationist White members of 
Congress who hailed from Southern districts in which large numbers 
of African Americans were disenfranchised.105 Although Black 
 
 101.  See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 135, 142–
50 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (discussing strategies employed by 
states to undermine the effectiveness of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 102.  In 1960, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia enforced a poll tax, and 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia 
employed a literacy test. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and 
White Voter Registration in the South, QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, 351, 374 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994). 
     103.   See Kousser, supra note 101, at 141–42 (recalling instances of armed violence in 
Louisiana and Mississippi). 
 104.  See, e.g., George C. Wallace, Governor of the State of Alabama, Inaugural Address 2 
(Jan. 14, 1963) (transcript available at http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/utils/getfile/collection/ 
voices/id/2952/filename/2953.pdf) (calling for “segregation today . . . segregation tomorrow . . . 
segregation forever”).  
 105.  One of the most prominent examples of failed civil rights legislative efforts is the Dyer 
Anti-Lynching Bill, which was repeatedly blocked in Congress due to the organized objections 
of Southern Democrats. See 67 CONG. REC. H1779 (1922). 
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representation in Congress and across other levels of government has 
increased in the current era, it is noteworthy that a full measure of 
representational equality remains elusive for minority Americans, 
including African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans.106 
4. Denying Substantive Benefits 
Finally, a significant feature closely related to the absence of 
representational power where a group is institutionally excluded is 
the lack of substantive responsiveness. There should be little surprise 
that the product of the system is little to no improvement in the 
material existence of non-White citizens in both real and relative 
terms compared with White citizens. Without efforts in elected bodies 
to advance the causes that are important to a given community, a 
group has little chance at directing policy toward its material benefit. 
The absence of any meaningful quantum of minority voter pressure in 
the political arena had the consequence of severely limiting the 
willingness of elected officials to focus on non-White citizens and 
their material needs and interests. 
The largely rural and agricultural based communities in the post-
Reconstruction South were and remain among the poorest in the 
nation.107 Among the starkest disparities was the funding of public 
schools, where the policy of maintaining inequity between Black and 
White schools was repeatedly invalidated by the federal courts.108 The 
persistent racial disparities were only possible due to the commitment 
of all-White legislatures to the cause of racial segregation and the 
wholesale denial of voter registration to African Americans in the 
South who otherwise would have challenged it. 
 
 106.  RONALD SCHMIDT, SR. ET AL., NEWCOMERS, OUTSIDERS, AND INSIDERS: 
IMMIGRANTS AND AMERICAN RACIAL POLITICS IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14 
(2009). 
 107.  Though all the residents in these areas suffered, African Americans continue to face 
the greatest economic challenges and lowest standards of living. See Angel L. Harris, The 
Economic and Educational State of Black Americans in the 21st Century: Should We be 
Optimistic or Concerned?, 37 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 241, 245 (2010) (noting that, “[i]n 
general, black Americans are disadvantage[d] across various measures of economic well-being” 
with regard to unemployment rates, durations of unemployment, net worth, and education). 
 108.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1964) (finding that a local 
school board decision to close public schools and provide vouchers to attend private schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 
(1955) (setting forth directions for implementing the Court’s earlier decision in Brown I); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring state laws establishing 
separate but equal public schools for black and white students unconstitutional); Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding public school segregation in the District of Columbia 
unconstitutional).  
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B. Contemporary Social Science Evidence 
The historical circumstances described above that we link to 
institutionalized racial exclusion did not disappear in 1965. They have 
left a legacy that illustrates the ongoing need for the project that 
Congress commenced when it adopted the Voting Rights Act. We next 
discuss the significance of these disparate conditions, and the 
remainder of this section details empirically quantifiable 
contemporary indicators of racial exclusion and discrimination that 
the Shelby County Court failed to consider in its majority opinion. 
The analysis documents systematic variation between covered and 
non-covered jurisdictions, and in particular, a higher degree of 
negative racial attitudes among White citizens in Section 5 areas. 
Furthermore, we provide evidence of racially polarized voting that 
demonstrates the landscape remains different in covered jurisdictions 
than in other states. Finally, covered jurisdictions are also more likely 
to employ voter disqualification policy measures than elsewhere. 
Taken together, the data demonstrates a continuing danger in 
preclearance locations of constitutional violations to the right to vote 
on the basis of race. 
1. Racial Attitudes 
Among the most enduring components of institutionalized 
exclusion is the enshrinement of negative racial attitudes toward non-
White groups.109 Whites’ resentment of non-White groups served as 
the foundation for the structures of political exclusion. Indeed, social 
science research has documented and continues to provide systematic 
evidence for the attitudinal legacies of slavery in political attitudes 
among Whites.110 
Data from the American National Election Study (ANES) of 2000 
and 2008 demonstrate the differences—both substantively and 
statistically significant—between White respondents to the surveys in 
covered and non-covered jurisdictions.111 Table 1 shows that Whites 
 
 109.  Brief of Political Science and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 6, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) [hereinafter Brief 
of Political Scientists] (“Racial animosity [was] embedded in the very ideology of segregation—
deeming some groups unworthy of the benefits of citizens.”). 
 110.  EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 148–52 
(2003); KEY, JR., supra note 93, at 4–6; Avidit Acharya et al., The Political Legacy of American 
Slavery 30–31 (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/slavery.pdf. 
 111.  American National Election Studies, 2000 and 2008, available at 
http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/download/datacenter_all_datasets.php. The data 
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living in Section 5 covered states are much more likely to hold 
attitudes consistent with racial antipathy against minorities. For 
example, 51% of the Whites residing in Section 5 states agreed that 
the government should not make any effort to help Blacks, compared 
with only 39% of Whites in non-covered states. Other measures of 
racial attitudes shown in Table 1 document the differences in 
antipathy toward groups either fully identified as minority or whose 
racial grouping is signaled by stereotypes (i.e., undocumented 
immigrants as Latino or Hispanic). 
Table 1. Racial Attitudes Among Whites in ANES, 2000 and 2008 
 2008 ANES 2000 ANES 
Statement Sec 5 Not 
Sec 5
Diff Sec 5 Not 
Sec 5 
Diff 
“Government should not make any 
special effort to help Blacks because 
they should help themselves.” 
 
51 39 12** 43 29 14** 
“Other minorities overcame prejudice 
and worked their way. Blacks should 
do the same without any special 
favors.” 
 
48 34 14** 42 32 10** 
“Generations of slavery and 
discrimination have created 
conditions that make it difficult for 
Blacks to work their way up” – 
percent who disagree 
 
61 47 14** 57 43 14** 
“If Blacks would only try harder they 
could be just as well off as Whites.” 
 
66 57 9* 54 45 9* 
“It is not the federal government’s 
business to see to it that Black people 
get fair treatment in jobs.” 
 
36 27 9* 38 32 6† 
“Do you personally hope the United 
States has an African American 
president in your lifetime.” 
 
48 56 -8* — — — 
“Oppose the U.S. government 
making it possible for undocumented 
immigrants to become U.S. citizens.” 
45 33 12** — — — 
Chi-square test results are statistically significant: ** P>.010 * P>.050, † P>.100. 





presented infra in Table 1 was compiled and organized separately by the authors. 
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Political Science surveys such as the ANES also ask respondents 
questions about whether and which groups have too much influence 
in American politics. Table 2 presents the differences between covered 
and non-covered states on these measures. White respondents in 
Section 5 covered states compared with non-covered states were more 
likely to say that Blacks, Latinos, Asians, and Jews had too much 
influence in American politics today, but were less likely to think 
Whites had too much influence. 
 Table 2. Perceptions of Group Influence Among Whites in ANES, 
2000 
  2000 ANES
Statement (percent who agree) Sec 5 Not Sec 5 Diff 
“Blacks have too much influence in American politics” 37 21 16** 
“Latinos have too much influence in American politics” 15 8 7* 
“Asians have too much influence in American politics” 10 5 5† 
“Jews have too much influence in American politics” 22 14 8* 
“Whites have too much influence in American politics” 16 23 -7* 
Chi-square test results are statistically significant: ** P>.010 * P>.050 † P>.100. 
Source: American National Election Study, 2000 data among White respondents. 
Similarly, data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election 
Study (CCES) based on interviews with more than 50,000 
respondents across the fifty states show systematic variation in racial 
resentment and anti-immigrant attitudes among White respondents 
living in covered states compared with non-covered states.112 The 
differences are detailed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Racial Attitudes Among Whites in CCES, 2010 
Percent Reporting Section 5 Non Sec 5   Diff 
Racial Resentment 66% 53% 13%*** 
Anti-immigrant attitudes 46% 35% 11%*** 
Chi-square test results are statistically significant: *** P>.001 ** P>.010 * P>.050. 





 112.  Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010, available at http://projects.iq. 
harvard.edu/cces/data?dvn_subpage=/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/17705 
(measuring racial resentment through responses to attitudinal items). The CCES is a large study 
that included questions on racial resentment for the sample of respondents. The survey sample 
is large enough to compare statistically significant differences across geographic locations.  
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Among White respondents in covered states, an average of 66% 
had high levels of racial resentment towards Blacks—a full thirteen 
points higher than the measure for Whites living in non-Section 5 
states. Among all of the states, White respondents in Alabama, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Georgia rated highest on their quotient of 
racial resentment—all four states are fully covered by Section 5.113 
White respondents in Section 5 states were also significantly more 
likely to report attitudes that were negative about immigrants and 
supportive of restricting immigrant rights than White respondents in 
non-Section 5 states and localities.114 Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Alaska, and Arizona had the highest degree of 
anti-immigrant attitudes in the CCES 2010 data.115 These states are all 
covered by Section 5, signifying consistency with other negative racial 
attitudes.  
2. The Persistence of Racially Polarized Voting 
These data are consistent with an abundance of published 
research in leading academic publications.116 Scholarly research in the 
last decade alone has produced findings showing that discriminatory 
attitudes towards Blacks and Latinos persist and that they are 
strongest among Whites in states covered by Section 5.117 Further, 
numerous scholars conclude that harboring negative racial attitudes is 
the underlying mechanism responsible for producing racial bloc 
voting among Whites against minority candidates for elected office.118 
 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id.  
 115.  Id.  
 116.  See, e.g., Dana Ables Morales, Racial Attitudes and Partisan Identification in the United 
States, 1980–1992, 5 PARTY POL. 191, 195–97 (1999); Nicholas A. Valentino & David O. Sears, 
Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South, 
49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 672, 677–84 (2005). 
 117.  See generally M. V. Hood III & Seth C. McKee, Gerrymandering on Georgia’s Mind: 
The Effects of Redistricting on Vote Choice in the 2006 Midterm Election, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 60 
(2008); Jonathan Knuckey, Racial Resentment and the Changing Partisanship of Southern 
Whites, 11 PARTY POL. 5 (2005); Richard Skinner & Philip A. Klinkner, Black, White, Brown 
and Cajun: The Racial Dynamics of the 2003 Louisiana Gubernatorial Election, 2 FORUM 1 
(2004).  
 118.  See, e.g., EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49–51 (1989); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL 
& MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON 
AMERICAN POLITICS 41 (1991); ROBERT HUCKFELDT & CAROL WEITZEL KOHFELD, RACE 
AND THE DECLINE OF CLASS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 46 (1989); KEITH REEVES, VOTING 
HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 74 
(1997); Michael W. Giles & Kaenan Hertz, Racial Threat and Partisan Identification, 88 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 317, 319 (1994). 
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In his study of racial attitudes and voting, Associate Professor Keith 
Reeves finds that “a significant number of whites harbor feelings of 
antipathy toward Black Americans as a categorical group—feelings 
and sentiments that are openly and routinely expressed. . . . And 
where such prejudices are excited . . . they constitute the critical 
linchpin in Black office-seekers’ success in garnering White votes.”119 
Writing more than ten years later about the 2008 presidential 
election, Michael Tesler and David Sears found the same pattern. 
Even after controlling for partisanship and ideology, they found “the 
most racially resentful were more than 70 percentage points more 
likely to support McCain in March 2008 than were the least racially 
resentful.”120 Other scholarly work also supports the finding that 
discriminatory attitudes and racial prejudice play key roles in driving 
White party identification, and this is especially strong in Section 5 
covered jurisdictions.121 
In extending the Voting Rights Act in 2006, Congress declared 
racially polarized voting to be “the clearest and strongest evidence the 
Committee has before it of the continued resistence [sic] within 
covered jurisdictions to fully accept minority citizens and their 
preferred candidates into the electoral process.”122 Racial bloc voting 
remains persistent and was evident in the voting behavior among 
Whites during the 2008 election of Barack Obama.123 
These racialized attitudes, in turn, help explain the persistence and 
magnitude of racially polarized voting in covered jurisdictions relative 
to non-covered jurisdictions. Following the election of Barack Obama 
in 2008, several political scientists took up the issue of racial prejudice 
and White voting patterns for Obama, relying on respected data 
sources and cutting-edge research methodologies.124 Political Scientist 
Michael Lewis-Beck summarizes the data succinctly when he writes, 
 
 119.  REEVES, supra note 118, at 74.  
 120.  MICHAEL TESLER & DAVID O. SEARS, OBAMA’S RACE: THE 2008 ELECTION AND 
THE DREAM OF A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 61 (2010). 
 121.  See CARMINES & STIMSON, supra note 118, at 49–51; Knuckey, supra note 117, at 59; 
Morales, supra note 116, at 197; Valentino & Sears, supra note 116, at 674–76. 
 122.  H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 34 (2006). 
 123.  Todd Donovan, Obama and the White Vote, 63 POL. RES. Q. 863, 870–72 (2010); 
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in the 2008 U.S. 
Presidential Election, 9 ANALYSIS SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 241, 248 (2009); Michael S. Lewis-
Beck et al., Obama’s Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost?, 43 POL. SCI. POL. 69, 72–74 (2010). 
 124.  TESLER, supra note 120, at 61; Lewis-Beck et al., supra note 123, at 75 (relying on 
established datasets regularly collected by political scientists, including the American National 
Election Study). 
CRAYTON AND JUNN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014 1:19 PM 
140 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9 
“The roots of Obama’s relative underperformance electorally can be 
laid at the feet of race prejudice. . . . Obama got the vote share he got, 
instead of the landslide that could have been expected. Race appears 
to have imposed a real cost on his electoral margin.”125 
Even before the Obama election, political scientists had amassed 
data with a particular eye toward Section 5 covered jurisdictions, and 
concluded that racial attitudes were driving partisanship and voting.126 
Jonathan Knuckey writes, “These findings suggest that race and racial 
attitudes continue to shape southern party politics in the early twenty-
first century.”127 Racial attitudes, and in particular expressions of racial 
antipathy in terms of opposition to policies aimed at enhancing 
politically egalitarian outcomes, are products of practices born from 
racially discriminatory political and social institutions. In Alabama, 
the state at issue in Shelby County, the adoption of discriminatory 
policies in the state’s 1901 Constitution (adopted by an all-White 
convention) was heavily informed by the desire to keep African 
American voters out of politics and in subservient positions in 
society.128 Subsequent developments maintained systems of exclusion 
and supported discriminatory practices.129 
To illustrate the effect of polarization in covered jurisdictions, 
Table 4 summarizes the level of support for Democratic candidates 
among White voters in covered and non-covered states for 
presidential elections in 2000, 2004, and 2008.130 The data illustrates 
that the level of White support for the Democratic nominee varies 
significantly between covered and non-covered states, and the 
difference is statistically significant for all years. The 2000 election 
shows that the average level of White voter support for the nominee 
was fourteen percentage points higher in non-covered states than in 
covered states. In 2004, the average level of White support in covered 
 
 125.  Lewis-Beck et al., supra note 123, at 75. 
 126.  See, e.g., Valentino & Sears, supra note 116, at 674. 
 127.  Knuckey, supra note 117, at 5. 
 128.  See John B. Knox, Inaugural Address (May 22, 1901), available at 
http://www.legislature.state.al.us/misc/history/constitutions/1901/proceedings/1901_proceedings_
vol1/day2.html (remarking that the Convention’s aim was “to establish white supremacy”); see 
also ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102; id. art. VIII, § 181(1); id. art. XIV, § 256.  
 129.  See, e.g., KEY, JR., supra note 93, at 37–46. 
 130.  See Brief of Political Scientists, supra note 109, at 22–26. A complete test of racially 
polarized voting would search for a sharp contrast in the level of support for a candidate among 
Whites compared to other racial groups. Amici curiae examine the preferences of White voters 
alone as an indicator, because well over a majority of the relevant non-White groups supported 
the Democratic ticket in each of the presidential elections at issue.  
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states was 25%, compared with 43% in non-covered states (a 
difference of 18.2 percentage points). In 2008, the level of White 
support in Section 5 states was 23% compared to an average of 48% 
in the rest of the country. 
Table 4. Polarized Voting Among Whites in the 2000, 2004, and 
2008 Presidential Elections 
Chi-square test results are statistically significant: *** P>.001 ** P>.010 * P>.050. 
Sources: National Exit Poll vote among White respondents 2000, 2004, 2008; and 
CCES 2010 for party identification among White voters. 
Among Whites, support for the Democratic candidate declined in 
the 2008 election, the year the nominee was Black. On average, White 
support in preclearance states dropped an additional two percentage 
points below that of the Democratic nominee in 2004. The extent of 
this drop-off provides another way to assess the extent to which White 
voters remain unwilling to vote for candidates due to race. In fact, 
more than half of the nine total states where the measure dropped for 
the Democratic nominee between 2004 and 2008 were covered 
jurisdictions.131 The State of Louisiana had the nation’s steepest 
decline in support among Whites, dropping ten percentage points 
during this period—from 24% to 14%.132 
These results are not simply the product of partisanship. Where 
nearly a third (32%) of Whites in Section 5 states identified as 
Democrats, less than a quarter (23%) supported the Democratic 
Party nominee for President in 2008, the lowest share of the three 
elections examined here. Moreover, though about the same 
percentage of White voters in the states of Utah (non-covered) and 
Georgia (covered) reported their affiliation with the Republican 
Party, the Black candidate in 2008 lost both statewide contests, but a 
much smaller share of White voters in Georgia supported the 
Democratic candidate than in Utah—one of the nation’s most 
 
 131.  Id. at 24. 





















Sec. 5 states 29 25 23 -2 -6 32 13 55 
Non-Sec. 5  43 43 48 5 5 39 12 49 
Difference -14** -18*** -25*** -7* -11* -7 1 6 
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Republican states.133 Thus political party affiliation does not fully 
account for the difference in states with roughly similar patterns of 
allegiance to the Republican Party. 
These findings comport with other existing research that has 
noted the pattern of polarized voting in national elections. The newest 
published research by political scientists finds evidence that, among 
White voters, Barack Obama received less support in 2008 than John 
Kerry did in 2004 in many Section 5 states, largely as a result of racial 
prejudice and discriminatory attitudes.134 In his analysis of the White 
vote for Obama in Southern states, Professor Ben Highton notes, “at 
the state level, the influence of prejudice on voting was comparable to 
the influence of partisanship and ideology. Racial attitudes explain 
support for Obama and shifts in Democratic voting between 2004 and 
2008.”135 This finding is corroborated by Spencer Piston’s searching 
individual-level analysis of voter attitudes and support for Barack 
Obama in Southern states, which confirm the view “that prejudice 
hurt Obama but not previous Democrats.”136 
Beyond the realm of voting, the research is quite clear that 
Section 5 states continue to witness discrimination against minorities 
in housing, education, employment, criminal justice, and the legal 
system.137 Not only does the evidence on racially polarized voting 
 
 133.  Id. at 24–25. According to the available data, about 30% of White voters in Utah 
identified as Democrats, and Barack Obama received about 31% of ballots cast by Whites. By 
comparison, Democrats are about 27% of all White voters, yet the Democratic ticket received 
only 23% of the White vote in 2008.  
 134.  See Donavan, supra note 123, at 867; Lewis-Beck et al., supra note 123, at 73; Tom 
Pyszczynski et al., Is Obama the Anti-Christ? Racial Priming, Extreme Criticisms of Barack 
Obama, and Attitudes Towards the 2008 US Presidential Candidates, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 863, 866 (2010).  
 135.  Benjamin Highton, Prejudice Rivals Partisanship and Ideology When Explaining the 
2008 Presidential Vote Across the States, 44 POL. SCI. & POL. 530, 530 (2011). 
 136.  Spencer Piston, How Explicit Racial Prejudice Hurt Obama in the 2008 Election, 32 
POL. BEHAV. 431, 447 (2010). 
 137.  See Pauline K. Brennan & Cassia Spohn, Race/Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes 
Among Drug Offenders in North Carolina, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 371, 372–73 (2008); 
Fidel Ezeala-Harrison et al., Housing Loan Patterns Toward Minority Borrowers in Mississippi: 
Analysis of Some Micro Data Evidence of Redlining, 35 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 43, 46 (2008); 
James H. Johnson, Jr. et al., Racial Apartheid in a Small North Carolina Town, 31 REV. BLACK 
POL. ECON. 89, 90–91 (2004); Bill Quigley, Racial Discrimination and the Legal System: The 
Recent Lessons of Louisiana, 44 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 3, 3 (2007); John B. Strait et al., 
Rubbing Elbows in the Big Easy: The Dynamics of Residential Segregation Among Racial and 
Ethnic Groups in New Orleans, Louisiana, 1990-2000, 47 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 254, 
282 (2007); Jeannie Haubert Weil, Finding Housing: Discrimination and Exploitation of Latinos 
in the Post-Katrina Rental Market, 22 ORG. & ENV’T 491, 498–500 (2009). See also Vanessa 
Wong, Twenty States with the Most Workplace Discrimination, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Jul. 29, 2011), http://images.businessweek.com/slideshows/20110728/twenty-states-with-the-
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point to a continued need for Section 5 preclearance in selected areas, 
but the data on racial attitudes clearly identify the symptom138 for 
which the Department of Justice review is the remedy. 
Knuckey concludes that “the increase in the effect of racial 
resentment should give pause to those who would diminish the role 
that racial conservatism played as an explanation for Republican 
gains among southern Whites in the 1990s.”139 And in a lengthy and 
thorough review of racial attitudes and voting, Political Scientist Todd 
Donovan finds, “[a]lthough there are prominent examples of African 
American candidates winning in electorates that are majority White, 
such cases have been relatively rare. The history of race and voting in 
the South demonstrates particularly high levels of racially polarized 
voting.”140 Without question, the data show that Whites in Section 5 
jurisdictions have higher rates of negative racial attitudes and 
prejudice than in non-Section 5 states.141 
3. Voting Qualification Rules 
The legacy of racial attitudes and institutionalized discrimination 
are manifest in the distinct pattern of legal devices now present in 
Section 5 states. Covered and partially covered jurisdictions are more 
likely than others to impose an array of restrictions on the exercise of 
the franchise. These restrictions, in turn, have a disparate impact on 
minority access to the polls. The data in Table 5 show that the 
differences between the states inside and outside the preclearance 
coverage regime are stark. States fully covered by Section 5 are more 
than twice as likely as non-covered states to adopt policies that make 
 
most-workplace-discrimination#slide1 (examining United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission [EEOC] merits resolutions—resolutions in favor of complainants—in 
discrimination charges for fiscal year 2010 and finding six of the nine fully covered jurisdictions 
among the top twenty most discriminatory states). Population size does not fully explain the 
inclusion of these fully covered jurisdictions. For instance, though Texas has a population that is 
more than ten million less than California, it had the most merit resolutions of any state. Id. 
And whereas Alabama is only the twenty-third largest state, it ranked number eleven in EEOC 
merit resolutions. Id. 
 138.  Steven A. Tuch & Michael Hughes, Whites’ Racial Policy Attitudes in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Continuing Significance of Racial Resentment, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 134, 143 (2011); see also TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN 
STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 174–78 (2001) (addressing 
evidence of racial resentment in other elections); Nicholas A. Valentino et al., Cues that Matter: 
How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 77 
(2002). 
 139.  Knuckey, supra note 117, at 64. 
 140.  Donovan, supra note 123, at 863  
 141.  See supra Part II.B.1; see also supra notes 117–122 and accompanying text.  
CRAYTON AND JUNN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014 1:19 PM 
144 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9 
voting more difficult for citizens, and are also more likely to employ a 
combination of these restrictive measures, which amplifies the 
disqualification effect on voters. 
Table 5. States with Limits on Enfranchisement by Section 5 
Coverage 











Percent of states that currently require 
identification to vote1 25% 30% 11% 
Percent that require or request photo ID 
to vote, current and pending clearance2 50% 50% 16% 
Percent requiring proof of citizenship to 
vote3 25% 13% 8% 
Percent that currently have permanent or 
partial limits on voting if felony 
conviction4 
38% 31% 16% 
States with most restrictive immigration-
control legislation as current law5 50% 29% 6% 
Number of states 8 16 34 
1National Conference of State Legislators, Oct. 2012. 
2National Conference of State Legislators, Oct. 2012 and Ballotpedia.com, Jan. 2013. 
3Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, June 2011. 
4ACLU Map of State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws (n.d.). 
5National Conference of State Legislatures, Aug. 2012. 
As Table 5 documents, states fully covered by Section 5 or that 
include covered jurisdictions are much more likely to institute policies 
that require citizens to produce potentially burdensome 
documentation proving their identities or citizenship before they are 
allowed to vote.142 The disproportionate impact that restrictive voter 
identification requirements have on Black and Latino voters is well-
established in both the scholarly literature and more general 
 
 142.  States covered by Section 5 are also more likely to adopt laws that permanently or 
partially limit the rights of convicted felons to vote. States that are not covered by Section 5 are 
much more likely to allow convicted felons to vote as soon as their sentences are completed. 
Because Blacks and Latinos are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, felon 
disenfranchisement laws disproportionately deprive minority citizens of the right to vote. See 
Mark Hugo Lopez & Gretchen Livingston, Hispanics and the Criminal Justice System: Low 
Confidence, High Exposure, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (April 7, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
files/reports/106.pdf (“Overall . . . some 4% of adult Hispanics in 2007 were either in prison or 
jail or on probation or parole. This is larger than the share of whites (2%) who were under some 
form of corrections control in 2007 and smaller than the share of blacks (9%).”) 
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analysis.143 
The presence of discrimination in covered locations compared 
with non-covered locations represents the continuing legacy of the 
institutionalization of racially discriminatory practices. Covered 
locations identified by Section 4 were the most persistent purveyors 
of government policies designed to disenfranchise minority voters 
prior to the Voting Rights Act. Described as such by the majority 
opinion of the Court in NAMUDNO, these “exceptional conditions 
justified extraordinary legislation.”144 Petitioner’s brief in Shelby 
County also acknowledged the long history of blatantly 
discriminatory practices that compelled Congress to provide federal 
authority in Section 5 for voting rights enforcement: “In 1965, 95 years 
after the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, African-Americans 
were still widely denied the right to vote throughout the South.”145 
Despite the Court’s recognition that the coverage formula links the 
genesis of unlawful election practices based in racial antipathy against 
minorities to preclearance status, the Shelby County Court failed to 
acknowledge the substantial empirical evidence of systematic racial 
disparity that continues to this day in locations originally targeted by 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act.146 
III. THREE WAYS FORWARD FOR VOTING RIGHTS 
The prior two Parts addressed the foundation for the Court’s 
decision to invalidate the formula undergirding the preclearance 
provision and offered an empirically based critique showing the 
fundamental flaws in the analysis offered by the Shelby County 
majority. Notwithstanding the problems with the decision, Congress is 
faced with a choice about how to approach the issue of voting rights 
and entrenching the guarantees contained in the Fifteenth 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Matt A. Barreto et al., Voter ID Requirements and the Disenfranchisements 
of Latino, Black and Asian Voters (Sept. 1, 2007), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/ 
mbarreto/research/Voter_ID_APSA.pdf; Gabriel R. Sanchez et al., Racial and Ethnic 
Differences in Access to Photo-ID in Texas, LATINO DECISIONS BLOG (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2012/03/21/racial-and-ethnic-differences-in-access-to-photo 
-id-in-texas/. 
 144.  NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 334 (1966)). 
 145.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at 1–2. 
 146.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he Court 
concludes that ‘current needs’—the modern existence of intentional racial discrimination in 
voting—do, in fact, justify Congress's 2006 reauthorization of the preclearance requirement 
imposed on covered jurisdictions by Section 5, as well as the preservation of the traditional 
coverage formula embodied in Section 4(b).”). 
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Amendment. In similar fashion, the larger civil rights bar must 
envision either a world in which it works within the constraints set by 
the Court or one in which it presses legislators to amend the Voting 
Rights Act. In light of what we see as the Roberts majority’s emergent 
philosophy on the democratic engagement of racial minorities, this 
Part addresses three possible options and offers comments in favor of 
a preferred strategy. 
We argue that Congress may take one of at least three responses 
to the Court’s decision in Shelby County: (1) effectively de-racialize 
the issue of voting rights; (2) rely more heavily on existing litigation 
remedies; or (3) restate and reinforce the preclearance provision with 
current data. Although the third option presents risks, both legal and 
political, it is the approach most consistent with the nation’s 
longstanding commitment to reform the racially discriminatory 
political culture in the covered jurisdictions. 
A. De-Racializing Election Reform 
The first option that Congress might take in light of Shelby 
County is a wholesale retreat from the question of race-conscious 
remedies on the subject of voting rights. This approach urges a 
strategic shift away from remedies that rely on the connection 
between racial discrimination and political structures.147 If one views 
the Court’s decision as decidedly hostile to the proposition that race 
still informs some of the barriers to full and fair political participation, 
then one might support a reform that turns away from the traditional 
approach to civil rights enforcement. 
This move might have more bi-partisan appeal because it would 
remove the stigma of racial animus that has been especially irksome 
for Republican officials in Southern states.148 Further, the measure 
would likely reach into more locations nationwide,149 which would 
respond to Chief Justice Roberts’s purported unease with the 
selectivity of the current regime. In addition, the move would answer 
 
 147.  See Richard Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Antidiscrimination to the 
Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 755–62 (2006); see also Jonathan Soros & Mark Schmitt, The 
Missing Right: A Constitutional Right to Vote, DEMOCRACY J. IDEAS (Spring 2013), http://www. 
democracyjournal.org/28/the-missing-right-a-constitutional-right-to-vote.php?page=all. 
 148.  See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 110, at 99–102.  
 149.  This is particularly true where a nationwide right to vote would alleviate special 
targeting to certain states and local jurisdictions. Several actors in the 2006 process suggested 
making the preclearance system apply nationally, a proposal that was viewed as a “poison pill” 
to the renewal process. 
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growing concerns from the residents of jurisdictions where emergent 
communities of color face voting problems that are not currently 
receiving special attention.150 The crucial challenge of this strategy 
would be to locate congressional authority in a constitutional 
provision other than the Fifteenth Amendment.151 Three examples 
help illustrate how the de-racialization strategy might translate into 
policy. 
1. A Real Right to Vote  
Perhaps the most well-known proposal that fits this model of 
reform is the proposed constitutional amendment to guarantee the 
right to vote. Although the Supreme Court has essentially read the 
franchise into the Fourteenth Amendment as a fundamental right—
characterizing the “right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s 
choice” as the “essence of a democratic society”152—backers of the 
amendment contend that an affirmative commitment to the right 
would provide the opportunity to recognize a more robust set of 
protections for citizens and obligations for states.153 The right could 
include not only the casting of a ballot but also the fair and effective 
counting of the ballot. 
Further, the right could impose specific limits on what a state may 
do to restrict the right to vote, thereby directly challenging existing 
doctrine that is inconsistent with a commitment to the fundamental 
right to vote. Some advocates would go so far as to imply that the 
provision could demand a legal bar on partisan gerrymandering, an 
 
 150.  Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630 (2013) (noting that “[i]f Congress had 
started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present coverage formula” 
because “[i]t would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a 
fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today's statistics tell an entirely different 
story . . . . [b]ut that is exactly what Congress has done”); NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) 
(“The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled 
out for preclearance. The statute's coverage formula is based on [outdated] data . . . , and there 
is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”). 
 151.  Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“The Fifteenth Amendment commands that the right 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race or color, and it gives Congress the 
power to enforce that command. The Amendment is not designed to punish for the past; its 
purpose is to ensure a better future.” (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 152.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (noting that “any restrictions on [the right 
to vote] strike at the heart of representative government”). 
 153.  Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Epilogue: Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional 
Right to Vote 11 (New York Univ. Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 381, 2013); 
see also John B. Anderson et al., Presidential Elections—The Right to Vote and Access to the 
Ballot, 29 NOVA L. REV. 571, 615–16 (2005). 
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issue on which the Supreme Court currently has no settled position.154 
In all cases, the proponents of this plan would argue that many 
ongoing concerns could be addressed by incorporating language in a 
constitutional provision that might empower Congress to adopt 
legislation to regulate states.155 
2. Elections Clause 
A second proposal takes a less ambitious approach than the 
constitutional amendment, and focuses instead on existing but 
seldom-used provisions in the founding charter. For example, the 
Supreme Court itself has recently turned its attention to the Elections 
Clause of Article I, which empowers Congress to set rules that 
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections.156 The federal 
 
 154.  See Vieth v. Jubilirer, 541 U.S. 267, 309–10 (2004); Lois Beckett, Is Partisan 
Gerrymandering Unconstitutional?, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www. 
propublica.org/article/is-partisan-gerrymandering-unconstitutional; Kali Borkoski, An Interview 
with Justice Stevens, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 3, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2011/11/an-interview-with-justice-stevens/ (stating that Justice Stevens contends that partisan 
gerrymandering is “outrageously unconstitutional”). Some states have taken such measures 
already, such as Florida. Florida’s Constitution was amended in 2010 to prohibit lawmakers 
from establishing apportionment plans “with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or 
an incumbent.” See FLA CONST. art. III, §§ 20–21. 
 155.  John Nichols, Time for a ‘Right to Vote’ Constitutional Amendment, THE NATION 
(Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/173200/time-right-vote-constitutional-
amendment# (justifying the need for a constitutional amendment because “[v]oting rights have 
too frequently been left to chance in the United States,” and noting that “[e]ven as the franchise 
has been extended through constitutional and other federal initiatives, the administration of 
elections has been left to states with radically different standards”); Norm Ornstein, The U.S. 
Needs a Constitutional Right to Vote, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/politics/archive/2013/10/the-us-needs-a-constitutional-right-to-vote/281033/ (“[T]he 
Constitution contains no explicit right to vote. . . . An explicit constitutional right to vote would 
give traction to individual Americans who are facing [voter-suppression] tactics, and to legal 
cases challenging restrictive laws.”); Jonathan Soros & Mark Schmitt, The Missing Right: A 
Constitutional Right to Vote, DEMOCRACY J. IDEAS (Spring 2013), http://www.democracy 
journal.org/28/the-missing-right-a-constitutional-right-to-vote.php?page=all (“[T]he right to 
vote is itself a subject of continued partisan, regional, and racial conflict. It’s time to resolve the 
fights, and fulfill the promise of American democracy, by joining together in an effort to make 
the right to vote, at last, a part of our basic covenant as a nation.”). Representative Mark Pocan 
(D-WI) proposed to amend the Constitution by adding the following: “Section 1. Every citizen 
of the United States, who is of legal voting age, shall have the fundamental right to vote in any 
public election held in the jurisdiction in which the citizen resides. Section 2. Congress shall 
have the power to enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation.” H.R.J. Res. 44, 
113th Cong. (2013). 
 156.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1–2; Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (“Of course, the Federal 
Government retains significant control over federal elections. For instance, the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner for electing Senators and 
Representatives.”); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257–58 
(2013) (“The Constitution prescribes a straightforward rule for the composition of the federal 
electorate. . . . [E]lectors in each State for the House of Representatives ‘shall have the 
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supervisory power in this area has long been recognized as an under-
utilized source of authority. In Colegrove v. Green,157 Justice 
Frankfurter concluded that an early one-person-one-vote claim was 
nonjusticiable because the Elections Clause committed the regulation 
of district line drawing (at least at the federal level) to Congress.158 
Invoking the same constitutional provision, Congress could command 
the states to abide by certain rules in elections involving campaigns 
for federal offices (which would include both presidential and mid-
term elections). 
To the extent that the Court is willing to endorse a robust 
interpretation of the Elections Clause, this approach is perhaps the 
most readily available national answer to the problem—at least as far 
as federal elections are concerned. Although it is not clear how 
broadly the federal power applies, particularly against a contrary and 
important state objective,159 the provision does provide an alternative 
and relatively straightforward source of power for legislation that 
guarantees access to the political system. Of course, the power would 
presumably not reach those elections for state and local government 
that occur in odd years without a federal election on the ballot.160 
3. Good Government Rules 
Other proposals favor the adoption of neutral procedural rules to 
help curtail decisions about the electoral system that might not reflect 
the best interests of a community. For instance, the public notice and 
comment concept is a simple but possibly effective means to assure 
careful consideration of new election laws. Absent the preclearance 
 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature,’ and 
the Seventeenth Amendment adopts the same criterion for senatorial elections.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 157.  328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 158.  Id. at 556. 
 159.  See Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2256–59 (outlining the proposed balance of power between 
state and federal enforcement regimes to regulate voter identification laws where the state has a 
policy that appears to conflict with that of a federal agency). 
 160.  Two examples of states that frequently hold their statewide races in the absence of 
federal campaigns are New Jersey and Virginia. Karl Kurtz, Why do Four States Have Odd-Year 
Elections, THE THICKEST AT STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 25, 2011), http://ncsl.typepad.com/ 
the_thicket/2011/08/why-do-four-states-have-odd-year-elections.html. Aside from these states, a 
multitude of county and local governments also hold elections that occur outside of the federal 
campaign window. See Jose P. Hernandez, Odd-Year vs. Even-Year Consolidated Elections in 
California, THE GREENLINING INST. (OCT. 2013), http://greenlining.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Research-Brief-Odd-Year-vs-Even-Year-Consolidated-Elections-in-
California.pdf (detailing the heightened costs associated with off-year elections at the local 
level). 
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process, a rule that imposes a general waiting period on any new 
legislation focused on voting would further several principles that are 
commonly associated with good governance. 
As an example, Professor Gilda Daniels has suggested a waiting 
period to ensure that the enacting jurisdiction has carefully 
considered the implications of the bill.161 It would also provide notice 
to the public of a pending change, which would prompt their attention 
to and involvement in developing new measures. And, where the 
proposed regulation raises problems, the procedural measure might 
offer potential plaintiffs time to negotiate change before the new 
measure is enacted. It would also offer more time to a plaintiff class to 
develop the terms of a lawsuit. 
*  *  * 
There is nothing inherently objectionable about any of the 
aforementioned ideas for responding to Shelby County. Indeed, one 
can imagine that they could operate quite well within an overall 
reform effort that takes on either of the other two broad strategies to 
be discussed below. However, they each heavily depend upon judicial 
endorsement of a broad federal authority to regulate elections that 
seems unlikely after Shelby County. This is particularly so where the 
legislative enactment might demand that jurisdictions assume burdens 
on their sovereignty that seem inconsistent with the expressed 
political preferences of their constituents.162 Unless advocates can 
assert new arguments to the Court—or the composition of the Court 
changes and new members are willing to rethink these principles—
one cannot see great promise in using these approaches to reframe 
the debate. 
The larger problem with relying only on these strategies as an 
answer to Shelby County is that they are insufficient substitutes for 
the kind of focused attention necessary in areas where the political 
environment remains divided by race. Chief Justice Roberts is surely 
correct that political conditions have improved over time in the areas 
identified by Section 4.163 However, he is incorrect to assert that these 
 
 161.  See Protecting the Right to Vote: Oversight of the Department of Justice’s Preparations 
for the 2008 General Election: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 106 
(2008) (statement of Gilda R. Daniels, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of 
Law); see also Heather Gerken, The Missing Right to Vote, SLATE (June 13, 2012), 
http://hive.slate.com/hive/how-can-we-fix-constitution/article/the-missing-right-to-vote. 
 162.  See Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (outlining the proposed yet untested balance of 
power between state and federal enforcement regimes to regulate voter identification laws). 
 163.  Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2628–29 (2013).  
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areas are now virtually indistinguishable from the remainder of the 
nation. By ignoring the ongoing differences within these areas, a de-
racialized reform effort might well miss severe manifestations of race 
discrimination present in the areas on which Section 5 focused. 
B. Litigation Centered Enforcement 
An alternate approach would take the Court’s invitation at face 
value and rely solely on litigation as a means of enforcing voting 
rights. Although it does not retreat from the cause of employing race-
based remedies, this approach departs from the strategy of using an 
administrative remedy, such as preclearance, to select jurisdictions 
based on their prior behavior. Instead, the remedial approach ties 
federal action to litigation activity, which would essentially isolate 
those parts of the country where plaintiffs successfully challenge 
discriminatory provisions and structures. 
The most commonly advocated version of this approach directs 
attention to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, an entitlement for 
plaintiffs to file lawsuits in district court that currently applies 
nationwide and adopts a traditional adversarial posture. By returning 
to lawsuit-based attacks on discriminatory provisions, litigants will be 
pressed to focus on the individual circumstances of each case. It is 
argued that little if anything would be lost in a reformed regime 
because many of the prior restraint measures that are built into 
Section 5 are also available using temporary restraining orders or 
preliminary injunctions. Ultimately, Congress could develop a more 
current record based on the rates of rights violations and associated 
court findings from Section 2 challenges that might later merit a more 
specialized administrative remedy. 
Some advocates would endorse a set of enhancements to Section 2 
that would offer greater ease with which to pursue voting litigation.164 
For example, one could push for a more forgiving standard for a 
preliminary injunction where voting regulations are concerned, in 
light of the pressing time considerations of elections. One might also 
suggest that relying on Section 3 (the bail-in procedure) represents an 
enhanced version of the traditional litigation approach.165 Under 
 
 164.  See Bernice M. Bird, Section 2 as an “Adequate Substitute” for Section 5: Proposing 
an “Effects-Only” Test as an Amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Dec. 
2012) (unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/bernice_bird/3/. 
 165.  See Travis Crum, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and 
Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010) (“[C]ivil rights groups can redefine the 
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Section 3, a jurisdiction that is found to have violated constitutional 
rights might be ordered to comply with the preclearance regime 
where a judge finds that remedy appropriate.166 Unlike the version of 
preclearance voided in Section 5, the trigger for coverage here would 
be more individualized and only follow after an evidentiary showing 
that the behavior of the jurisdiction demanded a more sweeping 
remedy than an order of damages. 
As appealing as a singular reliance on this litigation approach 
sounds in theory, it tends to ignore much of the reality that gave rise 
to the preclearance system in the first place—it was the inability of 
federal litigation on its own to address the problems that convinced 
Congress to develop an oversight scheme.167 The problems were too 
widespread and the defendants were too innovative; traditional 
lawsuits could not keep up with such a dynamic target.168 
Even though it is undisputed that the situation in covered states 
has improved since 1965, the time and costs associated with 
litigation—both for the Department of Justice and private civil rights 
attorneys—remain considerable.169 At present, the costs associated 
with obtaining experts, developing strategies, and conducting a trial 
would stretch present public and private resources quite thin. Further, 
the increased use of litigation would mean that states themselves 
would be subject to higher expenditures to respond to complaints. 
Even if lawsuits were successful, the negative byproducts of increased 
litigation makes this strategy rather undesirable. 
The proposals for litigation enhancement would also require 
Congress’s endorsement, which would presumably require votes from 
members who would be disinclined to increase the chances their 
states would find themselves named as defendants in race-based 
challenges. Though there may be some appeal in this approach 
relative to the preclearance system, it is not at all obvious that this 
effort would be more popular among opponents of anti-
 
preclearance regime through litigation.”). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (“Congress had found that 
case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in 
voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the 
obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits.”). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Voting Rights Act After the Supreme Court’s Decision in Shelby County: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice, 113th Cong. 52–58 (2013) (statement 
of Spencer Overton, Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School). 
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discrimination lawsuits.170 
Perhaps most daunting, though, is the very real possibility that the 
existing set of protections now contained in Section 2 will be struck 
down. A subset of the same parties that have attacked the 
constitutional basis for Section 5 have also vowed to turn their 
attention to undermine the effects-based test that supports Section 2’s 
concept of vote dilution.171 If successful, the effort could eliminate any 
effective legal protection in the Voting Rights Act. To the extent the 
Roberts majority already views affirmative action policies in contexts 
like education with disfavor,172 it is quite possible that such a future 
legal challenge in the voting rights sphere could succeed by framing 
the litigation as a departure from the principle that unconstitutional 
state-based discrimination has to be intentional in nature.173 
C. Reinforcing Existing Section 5 
The third approach, the one that we endorse, is an effort to 
reinforce the provision at issue in Shelby County. It takes the 
majority’s statement in Shelby County on its own terms as an 
invitation to show the Chief Justice what he does not see: a basis for 
differential treatment—using readily available information in the 
record. This approach would make explicit use of current relevant 
criteria in a formula that reinforces the ongoing legislative record to 
identify those communities with persistent problems of political 
incorporation. 
We reject the arguments favoring a wholesale retreat from the 
transformative approach of preclearance.174 First, nothing in Shelby 
 
 170.  See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 137–91 (1987) (describing a negative view of novel 
enforcement theories in the absence of congressional action to change the statute itself). 
 171.  See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893–94 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A clear 
understanding of the destructive assumptions that have developed to guide vote dilution 
decisions and the role we have given the federal courts in redrawing the political landscape of 
the Nation should make clear the pressing need for us to reassess our interpretation of the 
Act.”); THERNSTROM, supra note 170, at 233–35 (criticizing the application of “vote dilution” 
jurisprudence as a judicial misadventure). 
 172.  See supra Part I. 
 173.  Already, parties have put forth arguments in the context of Section 2 lawsuits 
advancing a limited interpretation of the provision against challenges to voter identification 
laws, suggesting that the provision is unconstitutional if applied to these statutes. See 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 21–25, Veasey v. Perry, No. 2:13-CV-193 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 
2013); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (“Our decisions, moreover, have 
made clear that action by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” (citation omitted)). 
 174.  See Kareem Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV. 201, 232 
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County establishes a clear statement that Congress may not devise a 
regulation that addresses a problem more pronounced in some states 
than in others. As Justice Ginsburg highlighted in her lively dissent, 
legislative enactments commonly differentiate among the states based 
upon the presence or absence of certain factors.175 And these criteria 
can work in situations where states are identified to benefit as well as 
to incur special responsibilities.176 
The majority offered no sufficient answer to this charge,177 which 
suggests that it does not view the differential approach to regulation 
as inherently troubling. Indeed, the majority seemed to focus on the 
need for a rational connection between the formula and current 
conditions on the ground.178 Of course, election regulation may be the 
presumptive domain of state sovereignty for the Court, but nothing in 
Shelby County purports to change the continued application of the 
City of Boerne line of cases.179 The cases following the City of Boerne 
logic make clear that because the Voting Right Act intersects two 
substantive areas of heightened constitutional attention, it deserves a 
level of deference in the fit analysis;180 there is little to suggest that a 
current-conditions formula would fail judicial review. 
Second, our approach is desirable because it utilizes an established 
set of principles and metrics already familiar to local jurisdictions and 
states that have been subject to Section 5. So too would the courts 
have greater ease in the application of a reinforced law. One great 
peril of completely scrapping the existing preclearance structure is 
that any new system would leave questions about meaning and 
application that would need to be resolved by the Supreme Court. 
 
 
(2010) (proposing “a distinct way of defining the substantive aims of the preclearance system”).  
 175.  See Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2649 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s unprecedented extension of the equal sovereignty principle outside its proper 
domain—the admission of new States—is capable of much mischief. Federal statutes that treat 
States disparately are hardly novelties. . . . Do such provisions remain safe given the Court’s 
expansion of equal sovereignty’s sway?” (citations omitted)). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See id. at 2630 (majority opinion) (“The dissent treats the Act as if it were just like any 
other piece of legislation, but this Court has made clear from the beginning that the Voting 
Rights Act is far from ordinary.”).  
 178.  See id. at 2631. 
 179.  See id. (purporting to address only the mismatch between the statute’s targeting 
formula and current conditions, which the Court refers to as an “initial prerequisite” for Section 
5 to be constitutional).  
 180.  See supra Part I. 
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With the reinforced law, the Court would be limited (at least to 
some extent) by existing precedent, which would tend to preserve the 
level of substantive improvement in representation for racial 
minorities in a given political community.181 Though there are, of 
course, issues that remain unclear or ambiguous under the current 
system, the terms of the debates are well laid out to interested parties. 
Starting anew poses some risks for minority populations, whose rights 
were hard won and whose continued progress in the political system 
should not be taken lightly. 
Finally, the approach takes account of what we find is the central 
concern of the preclearance system—the transformation of states with 
longstanding histories of racial exclusion. The goal is ultimately to aid 
in eliminating the vestiges of racially discriminatory culture and 
practices and to establish more durable and effective communities 
that are open to voters regardless of their race. Achieving this long-
term goal demands sustained attention to assure that hard won gains 
are not quickly reversed or lost. 
Notwithstanding the Roberts majority’s assertion to the 
contrary,182 important effects of the pre-1965 era of exclusion remain 
present and pronounced in much of the preclearance territory as 
compared to elsewhere.183 To the extent that these jurisdictions remain 
standouts, retreating from the task of reforming their systems 
essentially endorses the maintenance of institutionalized race 
discrimination, along with the backsliding Congress hoped to 
prevent.184 And those who would bear the greatest burden of such an 
outcome are the very populations that were deprived of their 
fundamental rights for an extended portion of this nation’s history. 
There are two broad approaches that Congress might take as part 
of this strategy to reinforce Section 4 and Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. To illustrate we offer likely scenarios that would indicate 
the geographic reach of adopting each approach. First, legislators 
could use current evidence that closely tracks participation factors 
 
 181.  Because the structure of Section 5 is intended to prevent jurisdictional backsliding, see 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 323 (2000), the reinforced provision would 
generally serve to maintain existing levels of representation and political clout for a protected 
group. 
 182.  See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (explaining how “things have changed 
dramatically”).  
 183.  See Brief of Political Scientists, supra note 109, at 39 n.115. 
 184.  Id. at 4–5. 
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very similar to those used by sponsors in 1965.185 Alternatively, 
Congress could take a more modern approach and marshal additional 
factors related to (though not directly analogous) to the factors 
traditionally used to support the preclearance formula. 
1. Participation Based Formula 
Even Chief Justice Roberts would agree that participation is a 
valid metric on which to assess the entrenchment of the right to 
vote.186 The apparent problem in Shelby County is that the metrics for 
turnout and registration have substantially improved since 1965, 
which in the majority’s view obviated the need for a continued 
remedy.187 Although racial parity seems the norm for presidential 
elections (the length of time that Congress used in 1965), Professor 
Bernard Fraga has provided helpful analysis showing the persistence 
of clear turnout differentials during mid-term election years that tend 
to distinguish areas that were subject to preclearance.188 In his 
treatment of data over a series of years, Fraga finds evidence for the 
proposition that Roberts embraces regarding turnout during 
presidential years: Blacks tend to have equal (or at times, greater) 
rates compared to Whites on turnout measures during the last two 
presidential elections, and preclearance states are generally more 
favorable on this score.189  
In stark contrast, however, patterns of voting turnout in midterm 
elections do not show parity. As Fraga writes: 
Nationwide, African-American voter turnout was approximately 
15 percentage points below that of the non-Hispanic White 
population in 2006, and 12 points below White turnout in 2010. In 
2008 and 2012, however, Black turnout was within 5 percentage 
points of White turnout. Despite recent gains, there is not 
consistent racial parity in voter turnout.190 
 
 185.  See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, supra note 101 at 7, 18–19.  
 186.  See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (relying on data showing an increase in African-
American voter registration). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Bernard Fraga, The SCOTUS Majority is Missing Exactly What the VRA Sought to 
Remedy, THE MONKEY CAGE (June 27, 2013), http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/27/the-scotus-
majority-is-missing-exactly-what-the-vra-sought-to-remedy/ (noting that whereas many 
Southern states ask citizens their race when they register to vote, other states do not; thus, 
estimates of race are made based on “census block demographic data and name matching”).  
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
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States like Texas, New York, Florida, and Virginia have markedly 
higher disparities between Black and White voter turnout in mid-
term election years.191 This trend helps to explain why one might find 
the rise of the Tea Party in the 2010 midterm election, shortly after 
Obama’s victory, a historic election of the nation’s first non-White 
president.192 But more to the point, these disparities offer some 
indication that incorporating off-year elections (involving only state 
and local races or midterm years) may lead to a different assessment. 
Insofar as midterm elections focus on legislators, who directly 
represent the people, Congress might find that a formula 
incorporating turnout during years that do not involve a presidential 
election reaches more jurisdictions than before. 
2. Formula Utilizing Racial Bias 
A second approach to an updated formula, which would likely 
incorporate much of the existing preclearance territory, could rely on 
current data on the demonstrated unwillingness of White voters to 
cooperate across racial lines. As mentioned in Part II of this Article, 
there are ample measures in political science that assess how 
frequently these negative and racialized viewpoints interact with the 
existing political structure to impede minority political effectiveness.193  
On this score, the Chief Justice maintains a clear hesitation about 
the relevance of this kind of data in his analysis. His negative 
comments about the preclearance formula in Shelby County instead 
fixate on the traditional participation factors that Congress identified 
in 1965.194 However, this critique would only be sensible if one 
assumes that the right to vote is limited to those steps necessary to 
cast a ballot in the election—the obvious main concern when outright 
vote denial was the norm. But the great weight of the case law, from 
Katzenbach to Thornburg v. Gingles,195 also expresses a much broader 
 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See CHRISTOPHER S. PARKER & MATT A. BARRETO, CHANGE THEY CAN’T BELIEVE 
IN: THE TEA PARTY AND REACTIONARY POLITICS IN AMERICA 214–17 (2013) (providing 
survey evidence that Tea Party members, even accounting for ideology, hold negative views 
about racial minorities in general and President Obama in particular). 
 193.  As discussed in Part II of this Article, there are ample measures applied in political 
science that assess how frequently these negative and racialized viewpoints interact with the 
existing political structure to impede minority political effectiveness. 
 194.  See Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013) (relying on voter registration 
data). 
 195.  478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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concern with the effectiveness of the votes that are cast.196 The 
political rules and systems that translate those ballots into electoral 
success and governing authority are equally at play. The second-
generation matters, which relate to how cast votes are aggregated and 
valued, are equally relevant to assessing the full and fair exercise of 
the right to vote.197 
Moreover, the Roberts majority’s fixation on the fact that 
Congress in 1965 did not explicitly address factors related to 
dilution198 is of no particular significance. The Southern strategy of 
enacting measures to achieve outright vote denial prior to the Voting 
Rights Act obviated the need for metrics to track the effectiveness of 
cast ballots. For the most part in the South, there were no votes cast 
by Blacks in any large number.199 Accordingly, one cannot rely upon 
the mere absence of these measures in the original formula as 
evidence that Congress never thought these issues were relevant. As 
the maps in Figures 1–3 show, political attitudes of racial resentment, 
anti-immigrant biases, and racial polarization are most prevalent in 
states covered by Section 5. This pattern persists for all three 
indicators of racial disparity.200 
 
 196.  See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1969) (“The Voting Rights 
Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations . . . . [T]he Act gives a 
broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes ‘all action necessary to 
make a vote effective.’” (citations omitted)).  
 197.  The term “second generation” voting issues refers to the problem of vote dilution, i.e, 
concerns having to do with the counting and value of cast ballots. See Chandler Davidson & 
Bernard Grofman, Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, supra note 102, at 3, 14–15 (discussing the parallel generations 
of voting rights research and measurement). These are related to the “first generation” matters 
concerning qualification for the franchise and casting of the ballot, however, the Shelby County 
Court sees these as distinct problems, not of concern to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See 
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“The dissent relies on ‘second generation barriers,’ which are 
not impediments to the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that affect the 
weight of minority votes. That does not cure the problem.”).  
 198.  See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (looking only to tests, devices, and low voting rate). 
 199.  See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 
523, 542 (1972) (noting that during and after Reconstruction, “the various disfranchising 
vehicles” served to wholly eliminate Blacks from the political process, with “rare exceptions”). 
    200.    In geographic fashion, these figures display upon the contemporary social science data 
referenced above by state. Figure 2 includes a total of eleven of the “top ten” racially polarized 
states due to a tie among four states. In each figure, the Section 5 states in the Deep South 
consistently fall within targeted areas. Though the three factors do not capture every one of the 
Section 5 jurisdictions, Section 5 jurisdictions do represent a majority of the areas where these 
disparity measures are the highest. Furthermore, there is no constitutional requirement that 
Congress design remedies that perfectly align with the states that were initially designated by 
the triggering formula. Where the underlying theory for the remedy is that the project of 
reforming originally designated states is a long term one, Congress could reasonably conclude 
that the evidence endorses an approach of caution before ending federal review. 
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CONCLUSION: AFTER SHELBY COUNTY 
Though the majority in NAMUDNO expressed uncertainty about 
whether there was sufficient justification for the burden of 
preclearance to outweigh the apparent unequal treatment among the 
states,201 the Shelby County Court was unequivocal.202 In NAMUNDO, 
judgment was rendered and the question regarding the evidence of 
continuing racial disparities was settled: “The statute’s coverage 
formula is now more than 35 years old, and there is considerable 
evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”203 
This comment about the age of the coverage formula belied the 
position that the majority eventually would take in Shelby County: 
The formula was both anachronistic and unnecessary.204 Contrary to 
 
 201.  See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (“[T]he fundamental principle of equal sovereignty 
remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”). 
 202.  Compare NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“The evil that § 5 is meant to address 
may no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.”), with Shelby 
Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (“[W]e expressed our broader concerns [in NAMUDNO] about the 
constitutionality of the [Voting Rights] Act. Congress could have updated the coverage formula 
at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 
4(b) unconstitutional.”). 
 203. NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. at 203.  
 204. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (“Congress did not use the record it compiled to 
shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based 
on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”). 
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the informed actions of Congress and the will of the American people, 
the Shelby County Court seemingly found that the era of the most 
pernicious racial discrimination—at the structural, institutional, and 
individual level—had ended.205 In contrast, the record of systemic and 
empirical evidence reviewed here reveals that continuing racial 
disparities in once-covered jurisdictions remain visible to the naked 
eye. Our ignominious past of slavery and the perpetuation of racial 
antipathy over the vast majority of the nation’s history remain 
codified in the political DNA of preclearance locations. Once 
blatantly enshrined in constitutions and state and local election laws, 
these social ills now are revealed through systematically higher levels 
of racial antipathy, racially-polarized voting, and barriers to voting 
that disproportionately affect minority voters in these locations. This 
considerable evidence, which persuaded vast majorities in Congress 
and a United States President, was nevertheless ignored and denied 
by Shelby County’s five-member majority. 
Institutionalized political exclusion based on race had profound 
effects not just on eliminating Black voting and registration, but also 
on election outcomes and public policy. It allowed governors like 
George Wallace to grandstand in support of maintaining all-White 
public universities.206 It was also the reason that Senators like Strom 
Thurmond and Richard Russell were able to block and dilute 
proposed national civil rights legislation during the first half of the 
twentieth century.207 A politics of, by, and for the concerns and 
interests of one racial group to the exclusion of all others is indeed 
the essence of racial entitlement. And the system designed to exclude 
Black political voices in the South was built to last. 
It would take the lives of many women and men in the civil rights 
movement and the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act for the 
nation to dedicate itself anew in the twentieth century to dismantling 
state-sponsored voting discrimination. The law’s constitutionality has 
been affirmed multiple times by the Supreme Court. In Katzenbach, 
 
 205.  See id. at 2631 (“Our country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in 
voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem 
speaks to current conditions.”). 
 206.  See George C. Wallace, Governor of the State of Alabama, Inaugural Address 2 (Jan. 
14, 1963) (transcript available at http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/utils/getfile/collection/ 
voices/id/2952/filename/2953.pdf). 
 207.  See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 
921 (2009) (describing the key role of Senators Russell and Thurmond in the effort to scuttle 
earlier civil rights provisions in 1957). 
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in which only one Justice partially dissented, the Court acknowledged 
the judiciary’s role in countenancing the entrenchment of race 
discrimination in politics.208  As recently as 2009, the majority opinion 
of the Roberts Court in NAMUDNO noted that, despite its 
misgivings about the statute, these systematic and state-sanctioned 
violations of rights were “exceptional conditions . . . [that] justified 
extraordinary legislation.”209 
As the petitioner in Shelby County observed, nearly a century 
would pass between the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and 
the implementation of the Voting Rights Act.210 Although the “half-
life” of the virulent racial antipathy that fueled discriminatory voting 
procedures in preclearance states is unknown, experience admonishes 
us all to take great care in eliminating effective safeguards until it is 
unequivocally demonstrable that covered jurisdictions are no 
different from non-covered locations. 
 
 208.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325–26 (1966). 
 209.  NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 210.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 88, at 2.  
